CRCE

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH INTO POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES

Demographics and Migration in Europe, East & West

A CRCE Colloquium

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Demographics and Migration in Europe, East & West

Contents:

Migration in Europe: Case Studies: Bulgaria & Romania
Chairman: Philip Hanson
Discussion Leaders: Krassen Stanchev and Oana-Valentina Suciu

Philip Hanson: We are embarking on the session dealing with migration and demographic trends, and we turn to case studies of Bulgaria and Romania. Our first speaker is Krassen Stanchev, a leading Bulgarian economist, who was a former Member of Parliament. We will follow with Oana Suciu, from the University of Bucharest, who has been working on political parties, ethnic minorities and the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe.

Krassen Stanchev: I was invited to update a paper written in 2004, together with my colleagues, on Bulgaria's migration. The paper was written with a particular methodology, discussing the decision to migrate as purely individual or as a family choice. We were looking at the incentives and we had a specific goal: to make a point about attempts to keep people in the country, prevent them from entering and seeking opportunities in a given country. We wanted to make these points not only about Bulgaria but also because we believed they were relevant policies throughout Eastern Europe and 'recipient' countries of old Europe. However, we did not manage to raise enough funds, so we ended up with a Bulgarian survey.

The political mood in 2004 was such that there was a uniform effort to prevent citizens of the new member states coming to Europe on work permits, or any other form of labour migration. Then, due to the flat-tax movement in the new member states, attempts were made to unify taxes across Europe, blaming so called tax dumping between 2004 and 2010. On the tax front there is an attempt to unify tax reporting, rather than rates, although there is tacit general discussion about rates. The unification of migration policies is part of the landscape. In 2005, there was a green paper produced by the European Union followed by consistent attempts to convert this green paper into some sort of economic migration policy. So far, these attempts to produce an enforceable policy have failed. I do not think that in the near future the European Union will have a common and encompassing migration policy, similar to the Common Agricultural Policy.

What we found in 2004 remains valid in 2010. I will summarise these six years . The situation is interesting because in this period there was a crisis and there were different dynamics of the process compared to the time before Romania and Bulgaria's formal entry to the EU; although the differences are rather technical, not principal, which are not incentives to move and seek opportunities in old Europe. The crisis of 2008-2010 did not alter anything in the underlying motivation to migrate.

At the start of 2004 the Bulgarian immigrant population was roughly 10% of the population, for the entire period since 1989. The profile is very similar to that of the profile of 'Polish Plumbers' - Polish workers in the UK or France. The development was quite prominent after Bulgaria joined the EU. In fact, the percentage of Bulgarians who work in the EU increased by 5% and is now 15% of the whole population. This is an estimate and a census scheduled for early next year, should provide exact numbers. Bulgaria is also specific in another respect, it has the lowest share of the active population with respect to the total population in Europe; only 54%

of the population is active. Next is Hungary with 57%. So, this is the main reason why Bulgaria stands out, as it has the highest active population working abroad. There is no other such country in Europe, and the World Bank 2001 Poverty Assessment paper has even suggested no other country in the world, although I am not sure about that. The second factor of this peculiar situation of Bulgaria is that the country has a large Turkish population. They know the language, and have confronted a difficult history recently – especially in the years immediately before 1989. In the winter of 1984-85 all of them were compulsorily renamed with Christian or Slav names. Needless to say, this was a perverted form of ethnic oppression; about a thousand Turk leaders were jailed and it took them three years to become organised and reclaim their names peacefully. In response to this claim, 300,000 of Bulgaria's Turks were expelled to Turkey between May and August 1989. (For a comparison, from April 1938 to August 1939 "only" 100,000 Austrian Jews were forced to emigrate.) Almost all hastily sold their land, houses and flats.

In early-mid 1990 the government promised to restore the old names, and the first freely-elected post-communist Parliament did so in the autumn that year. 270,000 returned and obtained dual nationality. Bulgaria enacted the most comprehensive restitution of nationalised properties, but the Turks failed to regain their property rights as most houses and flats have been sold on several times within six or seven months. So the Bulgarian Turks were compensated in kind, and also became eligible for pensions and other benefits in both countries.

This turned the Bulgarian Turks into the most mobile labour force on the fringes of the EU. If Turkey develops and grows faster than Bulgaria (e.g. this year (2010) the GDP growth rate in Turkey is expected to be around 9%), Bulgarian Turks will move to work there and vice versa. Between 2001 and 2007/8 Turkey did not perform well, so they returned to Bulgaria which was growing at 6% per annum.

The impact of this freedom of movement is very positive for both countries. One extraordinary example is the role of the Bulgarian Turks in opening the Russian market for Turkey's tourism industry. They were the segment of the workforce which developed the Russian tourist market, because they were educated and spoke Russian, whereas very few in Turkey did, so when they entered the service industry, they were channelled to tourism. They developed a tour operator business with Russia, and now Russian-speaking tourists form about 35% of the Turkish holiday market. When Bulgaria was growing at around 6% per annum between 1998 and 2008, there was a return migration. Around 7 or 8% of the Bulgarian migrants returned to the region after Bulgaria joined the EU, but the less qualified population, especially gypsies, went to Western Europe to find better work and living opportunities.

The UK figures on incentives for Bulgarians to emigrate are much the same as those in the rest of old Europe. They stem from the past and more recent economic processes: destruction of property rights under communist rule went deeper than in the other Comecon countries' integration with the USSR. Connected with this are longer-term economic reorientation and the social costs of 1996/7 when a domestic crisis was caused by the absurd socialist attempt to restore central planning. We found that in the period between 1998 and 2005, the average monthly wage increased steadily in line with productivity but was compensated for losses of 1996-1997. In the

international perspective they remain between 5.5 and 7 times lower than the countries of old Europe, where Bulgarians chose to emigrate to. In Spain, the next major destination for Bulgarians, the wage differential was somewhat less striking, but for Germany the original ratio was 13.5 times higher.

During the 2008-2009 crisis, although in Bulgaria this only started in spring 2009, the real wages were 7 times lower than old Europe averages (including Greece, where about 200,000 Bulgarians work). Due to Bulgaria's decline in 1996-1997, at the beginning of the period, the German wage level was 22 times higher than in Bulgaria, then fell 13.5 times and is now 17 times higher. But this is not the only motivation to emigrate. Non-tangible motivation is also important for a better educated labour force because there is simply nothing to do in Bulgaria. For example, if you have a degree in nuclear physics, there is just one employment opportunity: at the Nuclear Research and Energy Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, which is overstaffed by underpaid scientists of pensionable age plus a nuclear power station of soviet design. It is obviously better to try elsewhere such as CERN in Switzerland. The same is true for an economist or a lawyer, since Bulgaria seems overstaffed with such professionals. (This was an obvious opportunity until 2000-2003, when Wall Street and the London Stock Exchange started restructuring investment banking and Bulgaria enjoyed a huge influx of Bulgarian bankers from the City of London. They became company managers, politicians and ministers: for example, the Ministers of Finance and Economy, advisers to the Prime Minister, etc. Around one hundred investment bankers came back to Bulgaria in 2001).

What is also important as a general motivation is the level of productivity, and the more productive the economy is, the more incentives there are for well-educated people to look for business or labour opportunities. So, the situation was at the beginning in 1998, when Bulgaria's productivity stood at 25% of the EU's average level; by 2003 it was 30%; in 2007 it was 35% and in 2010 it was down to 32% due to the government's unwise policies. One peculiarity during the economic crisis is that there was a strict fiscal policy between 1997 and 2008 in Bulgaria, but in 2009 the fiscal discipline was compromised and there was a consistent effort to implement some sort of fiscal stimulus: the greater the stimulus in 2008-2010, the deeper the economic slowdown.

The Bulgarian public has a well-developed economic sense. They basically understood all these issues and tried to find different development opportunities for themselves during the crisis. What happened after Bulgaria's formal EU membership was the increase of Bulgarian labour immigrants in the EU and in general it led to an increase by 5% of the population; in total about 15% of the population. In addition, the level of remittances doubled in the period after 2008, and they have become a significant factor of the local economy. In 2001 remittances were at the level of 50% of FDI; in 2009 this figure increased to 78%, and in the first quarter of 2010, the remittances constituted 12% of FDI, because FDI is decreasing whereas remittances are increasing.

The comparison with 2007 is very telling: then FDIs were 30% of GDP (as an amount it is € 9 billion, 1/3 of the FDIs in all Balkan countries except Turkey and equal to FDI in Brazil's 100 million population). In 2010 it is about 8% of GDP.

There were welfare effects as well; the remittances during the entire period were equal to roughly 80% of government expenditure on education and healthcare. In 2010 the remittances are equal to both areas respectively, and the remittances in 2010 are roughly one third of the central budget transfer to the pay as you go system.
Bulgaria does not have any policy regulating migration, persuading the population of staying in the country, or preventing gypsies from going to France.

Migration in Europe: Case Studies: Bulgaria and Romania

Oana-Valentina Suciu: Migration and demographic trends in Romania: A brief historical outlook

Romania: Background Information

Capital: Bucharest. Official language: Romanian Area: 237,500 km2
Population (2002): 21,680, 974 Population density: 90.9 inhabitants per km2
Population growth (natural increase): -1.9 % (2005), -1.7% (2007) (the 18th year of negative demographic growth)
Foreign citizens as percentage of total population: 0.2 % (MIRA)
Labour force participation rate (2005): 62.4 % (INS)
Unemployment rate: 7.7% (May 2010), 4.5 % (April 2007), 5.4 % (2006), 5.9 % (2005) (INS)
Religious denominations (2002 census): 86.8 % Romanian Orthodox; 4.7 % Roman Catholic; 3.2 % Reformed; 1.5 % Pentecostal 0.9 % Greek Catholic; 2.7 % other; 0.2 % no religion, atheist or not stated
Net Migration Rate (2005-2010): - 1.9 migrants /1,000 population
Immigrants (2010**):** 0.6% Women as a Percentage of Immigrants (2010): 51.3%

Introduction[1]

Historical Trends in Emigration and Immigration

During the past century Romania has been mainly a country of emigration rather than immigration, with quite an impressive record regarding the number of persons subjected to the phenomenon of migration, with various and sometimes surprising migratory arrangements. As in other new-established states in the region, migration in Romania was, at least until the early 1990s, closely linked to the ethnic minorities – which were mainly the first to emigrate, especially after the establishment of the communist rule: Germans, Jews, Armenians, Hungarians, Greeks, etc. These minorities were not simply refugees: they moved to countries where they had historical ties (e.g. Germany, Hungary, Israel, Greece, US in the case of Armenians), both as a reaction to general and particular ethnic-based discrimination in Romania, and also in the hope for a safer and better life in the countries of their ancestors. The omnipresent political violence and physical deprivations, chiefly generated by an ineffective and totalitarian system, were further reasons for many Romanians to emigrate during and immediately after the demise of the Communist era.

Aspects of migration before Communism

What is defined as Romania, in its present-day shape, is actually a composition of various territories, former autonomous political entities, with different histories and a mosaic of nationalities: the result of wars, emigration and economic relations. Hungarians and Saxons in Transylvania, Jews in all regions, Armenians and Greeks in Moldova and Ţara Românească, Slovaks, Czechs and Ruthenians in Western

[1] The author would like to thank the following for support provided in identifying information and comments: Radu Moţoc (Soros Foundation, Romania), Mălina Voicu (Institute for the Quality of Life), Radu Cristescu (Centre for Institutional Analysis and Development), Dana Berdilă (The Romanian Cultural Institute).
Please do not quote without the permission of the author. Comments welcomed! Thank you! oana.suciu@fspub.unibuc.ro ; oanavalentina_suciu@yahoo.co.uk

Transylvania, Turks and Tatars in Dobrudja, and Roma, scattered all over the place; they all settled throughout the centuries in what came to be known as Romania. The population increased from 4,800,000 in 1880 to 7,300,000 in 1913 - it doubled in less than 25 years - a demographic progress that stemmed out from economic development. In 1918, at the end of World War I, Romania was one of the largest sovereign territories of Central and Eastern Europe. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Romania was predominantly a country of emigration. In this period, the first large-scale outflow occurred in the context of the great wave of Eastern European migration to North America. It was mostly the population of Transylvania (incorporated into Romania after 1918) that emigrated; in the first decade of the 20th century alone, 250,000 people from this province (with a total population of 4.8 million in 1900) emigrated to the United States, especially during the famous Gold Rush.[2] Approximately 200,000 ethnic Hungarians left Transylvania (which had been passed from Hungarian to Romanian authority) between 1918 and 1922.

Even though Romania was on the winning side in World War II, it never regained the territories lost to the Soviets. Part of the territories won in 1918, and a significant proportion of the Romanian population were lost, but the Romanian state succeeded in retaining Transylvania and all territories in the west of the country; the north of Bucovina was incorporated in Ukraine, while Bessarabia was to become the Soviet Republic of Moldova.[3]

[2] A famous story of this period is of the "Woman in Red", a Romanian lady who had emigrated from Banat and became the companion of John Dillinger, Public Enemy No. 1. It is said that she helped the US authorities to catch the famous perpetrator. Her story inspired one of the most interesting novels in Romanian contemporary literature – "Femeia în Roşu", by Mircea Mihăieş, Adriana Babeţi and Mircea Nedelciu.

[3] Oana-Valentina Suciu, "The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities through Ethnic-based Parties", unpublished doctoral thesis, 2008

Figure 1: The Making of Romania: 1858 - 1920



Romania experienced large-scale population transfers. The bulk of the Jewish population living on Romania's present territory was deported (by either Romanian or Hungarian authorities); the Holocaust reduced Romania's Jewish population of 780,000 persons by half. Following the Second World War, approximately 70,000 ethnic Germans were deported to the Soviet Union, and many more were forcibly relocated within Romanian territory, in the plain of Bărăgan.

The Communist era (1947-1989)

During Communist rule, Romanian authorities exercised restrictive exit policies, severely limiting international travel. Passports were held by the Militia and prior approval from the communist authorities was required to obtain a travel document. Those applying as emigrants to various embassies in Romania had their social and economic rights revoked and were (together with their families and sometimes even their friends) harassed by authorities.

Between 1946 and 1948, immediately after the installation of the communist regime, a part of the political, economic and cultural elite managed to leave, although there are no exact figures. Moreover, most of the regime's potential opponents ended up in

prison, to be offered parole only in 1965. The forced migration went on for approximately 40 years. Moreover, dissidents and prospective protesters were encouraged, although not in an obvious way, to leave the country. The communists hoped they could minimize the impact that these protesters might have had in the population at large. Many members of these families, especially of the bourgeoisie, are currently either living abroad or share their time between Romania and another Western country, with dual nationality, so keeping count is extremely difficult.

Although the regime kept the emigration under strict control, it still occured, sometimes even in respectable numbers. This is not as bizarre as it looks at first sight, since emigration per se was not forbidden, but the possibility that this could change into a migration wave based on asylum applications (often, these people were considered political refugees). The communist authorities were afraid that asylum-seeking by a large number of Romanians would discredit the regime and threaten its legitimacy as a functional political system, in the eyes of both foreign governments (especially Western ones) and those people who did not or could not leave the country.[4]

Ethnic minorities (Jews, Germans and Hungarians) were clearly over-represented among those who legally emigrated from Romania during Communist rule. Immediately after WWII the communist authorities literally started to sell the Romanian citizens of German and Jewish descent to Western Germany and to Israel respectively. Under communist rule the majority of Romanian Jews (between 300,000 and 350,000 persons) emigrated to either Palestine/Israel or the United States. The emigration of both the ethnic Germans and Jews came under close scrutiny by the communist authorities. The reason was quite simple – Germans and Jews were a priceless commodity in the Western markets. During the last years of the communist regime, the measures against the ethnic minorities reached a peak hard to imagine by an outsider - the "allogenic" elements from all the public institutions were purged. On top of that, Ceauşescu literally sold the minorities to their kin-states – Saxons to Germany and Jews to Israel. In the case of the Jewish population, this type of deal was not new – en masse emigration had also been encouraged in the late 1950s. By 1958, hundreds of thousands of Romanian citizens of Jewish descent were granted permanent emigration visas to Palestine, despite furious protests coming from the Middle East. Only the fact that the USSR was also interested in the region forced the Romanian communist government to halt the emigration[5], although only briefly. In 1961, in return for huge sums of money paid by the Israeli state, Jewish families were granted passports in order to leave for Western European countries – it was absolutely clear, nevertheless, what was their final destination![6] The deal continued under the Ceauşescu regime – the minimum sum paid for a person was 2,000 US dollars. The memoirs of various Securitate officers, who defected, mention that the sums ranged from 15,500 US dollars up to 250,000 dollars per capita, depending on the applicants' age, educational and professional credentials. For those released from prison, an extra tax was levied. The "business" was so profitable, that Ceauşescu decided to apply the same tactic with the German population, after establishing diplomatic relations with

[4] Istvan Horvath, *Romania: Country Profile,* in Focus MIGRATION, No. 9, September 2007
[5] In countless cases, people who have sold all their property and informed their employers (the State in all the cases) that they were emigrating, found themselves in a situation of no-return and no-forward.
[6] Ghiţă Ionescu, *Comunismul în România*, Editura Litera, Bucharest, 1994

the Federal Republic of Germany in 1967.[7] The policy was clear: whoever wished to emigrate (from the ethnic minorities) was welcome to do so – it was profitable and was helping to create a homogenous Romanian population.

The same sources mention the fact that Nicolae Ceauşescu had at the end of 1989, just before his fall, approximately 400 million dollars in his accounts from the taxation of legal emigrants from the country.

German Ministry of Interior Statistics show that between 1950 and 1989 approximately 240,000 Romanian citizens settled in Germany[8]; even if Saxons and Schwabs represented only 1.6% of the population in the 1977 census, they constituted 44% of the emigrant population between 1975 and 1989. Ethnic Hungarians were in a slightly different situation, considering that their home country was a communist state. However, beginning in 1985, Hungarians and Szeklers emigrated in increasing numbers across the border. In this case the vast majority of those leaving used mainly illegal (at that time) strategies such as crossing the green forest border with no papers, living in Hungary with no residence permit, etc.). Obviously, this migration was not approved by the communist Romanian authorities, who were rather nervous about the latent negative effect of a potential big and uncontrolled migratory loss on the country's international reputation and image.

Table 1: Emigration from Romania 1975 - 1989

	Share of general population (1977 census)	**Share of emigrant population (1975 – 1989)**
Romanians	87.0%	35.5%
Germans (Saxons)	1.6%	44.2%
Hungarians	7.9%	12.8%
Jews	0.1%	5.5%
Others	3.3%	2.1%

Source: National Institute of Statistics, Romania (INS)

One can identify a few patterns of temporary migration even during Communist times, notably for the purposes of education and work. "Labour migration was exclusively state-managed, and a large majority of Romanian workers headed to the Middle East, particularly to the Persian Gulf area, where their labour activities were tightly regulated and family reunification forbidden."[9]

The inflow of foreign migrants was somewhat limited during the Communist era, as any alien – especially those from "unfriendly" countries – was considered by the authorities to be a potential threat. Visiting foreign citizens were monitored closely, even those who visited their friends and family members; Romanians had the legal responsibility to report to the authorities any non-Romanian citizen visiting their homes.

[7] Dennis Deletant, *Ceauşescu şi Securitatea*, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 1998
[8] http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Broschueren/EN/Migration_und_Integration_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
[9] Horvath, op. cit.

Figure 2: Romanian emigrants, 1957-1989



Source: Istvan Horvath - Institutul Naţional de Statistică (INS) (2006); SOPEMI

Table 2: Main destinations of permanent migration between 1980-1989

Germany	USA	Hungary	Canada	Italy	Austria	France	Israel	Sweden	Greece	Australia	Other	Total		
149,544	33,931	27,250	7,495	3,128	9,275	4,593	14,629	4,909	3,131	3,646	26,622	287,753	N	Total 1980-89
52%	**11.8%**	**9.5%**	**2.6%**	**1.1%**	**3.2%**	**1.6%**	**5.1%**	**1.7%**	**1.1%**	**1.3%**	**9.3%**	**100**	**%**	

The wave of emigration from Romania presents two phases: the first between 1957 until 1965, with a peak of approximately 30,000 people leaving in this year. The trend decreased for a few years, after the so-called liberalization brought forward by the new management of the Romanian Communist Party and Nicolae Ceauşescu's appointment to the party leadership. There was almost non-existent emigration in 1968, when many Romanians, especially intellectuals, were taken aback by Ceauşescu's public condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The phenomenon did not last, since what was believed to be a more liberal view of communism proved to be a hoax, and was soon followed by the adoption of the Asian communist models from China and North Korea. The results were multiple and multi-layered, with terrible effects on Romanian society – one being the increased wave of emigration, that reached its peak in 1989, with over 40,000 people legally escaping the system. One should also keep in mind the numerous defections (tourists travelling abroad who never returned). Some were translated into asylum applications in various OECD countries with a peak, again, in 1989. It should be noted that these are the figures for the so-called "legal" migration, i.e. people who have applied for a passport to leave the country permanently; what is not known is the number of the "illegal"

emigrants, the "rescapes", those who decided to defect without applying to emigrate, as such, but just failed to return after a trip abroad, usually in the West.

Figure 3: Asylum applications by Romanian citizens in OECD countries, 1980-1989



Source: UNHCR

As a counter-balance to the permission granted for some Romanians working or studying abroad, there were some exceptions to this suspicious attitude toward aliens: foreign students, especially from the Middle East and African countries, were well represented at Romanian universities from the 1970s onwards. At its peak, the annual stock of foreign students rose to 16,900, representing 7-8% of all students registered at Romanian universities in 1981.

Migration after 1989

The migration phenomenon continued after 1989, although the conditions that led to the previous migration waves had either disappeared or were improving. On the other hand, the new political and economic circumstances generated other social prospects that were translated into three types of migration: the first is represented by the continued emigration to Western countries, although this was no longer political, but mainly economical; the second is represented by immigration. Romania had begun to be attractive, at least in the last five years, to nationals from third party countries, and also to Westerners working in multinationals; last but not least, an initially unexpected phenomenon, one with the increased harsh employment in the urban areas, some people started to move back to the countryside, where they or their ancestors came from.

Figure 4: Immigration and emigration Romania 1990-2007[10]



The permanent emigration wave from Romania started to decrease steadily in 1991, after the last bulk of migrations of the Saxons/Germans from Transylvania and Banat in 1990-1992 and some Hungarians from the middle of the country. The German emigration continued at an average of approx. 20,000 per year between 1993 and 1998, and a much lower level after 1999, especially since the remaining population has diminished. Permanent migration continued to North America, particularly after 1999, although an identifiable pattern is very difficult, as it is spread throughout the US and Canada.

Immigration, on the other hand, began to increase slightly on a yearly basis, and by 2007 the emigration rate was approximately the same as the immigration rate. Once there was a transition to a market economy and the freedom to bear passports and travel, Romania encountered a new phenomenon, or rather a repetition of that at the beginning of the 20th century: i.e. the temporary work migration.

[10] Dumitru Sandu, Monica Alexandru, *Migraţia şi consecinţele sale*, in Marian Preda (ed.). *Riscuri şi inechităţi sociale în România*, September 2009, http://cparsd.presidency.ro/upload/CPARSD_raport_extins.pdf

Emigration from Romania 1990-2010

Over the past two decades, the lengthy and socially burdensome transition process from a centrally-planned economy to an efficiently functioning market-economy has enhanced a drive for many Romanians to seek employment in other parts of the world. The chaotic transition generated a lower number of available jobs in the Romanian labour market; as a result, over 2 million people oriented themselves, over time, towards the Western European labour market. The results are two-sided: on one hand, the results of the work abroad can be seen in the level of money transfers back home, which steadily increased from year to year, only to decrease in 2008, when the economic crisis started to show in the Western labour market as well. On the other hand, the fact that young people, aged between 20 and 50, left the country has a negative effect on the Romanian economy. If we couple these effects with an aging population (Romania is subject to a negative demographic increase for the last 20 years), the result is translated through a need of labour immigration in the near future[11]. This is another challenge that the Romanian authorities face i.e. coping with a potential outflow of labourers from third-party countries, developing policies for their integration in the labour market, considering the limited experience Romania has in this field.

Also, as well as the economic migrants, Romanian students after 1990, had the opportunity to go and study abroad in Western Europe and in North America; many of them stayed in the respective countries after graduation, especially since the labour market in their field of activity was more developed in those countries than at home.

[11] The presumption put forward by sociologist Istvan Horvath in 2007 proves to be right, especially if we look at the fact that in the field of constructions, for instance, because of the increasing lack of domestic qualified labourers, the work force is replaced with immigrants from China and Pakistan.

Table 3: Emigration from Romania 1990 - 2008

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
PERMANENT EMIGRATION	high level: between 30,000 to 100,000 emigrants per year			average level, around 20,000 per year						low level, around 11,000 per year									
	high German emigration			still prevalence of German emigration						prevalence of North American Emigration				dispersed emigration					
TEMPORARY EMIGRATION	low rate, early adopters of migration abroad as innovative life strategy						higher rate, semi-legal, highest dispersion of destinations, high selectivity						free short term circulation in Schengen space, highest rates, decreasing selectivity; 50% in Italy and 25% in Spain				Post EU accession period, more visible, structural changes. 30% in Spain, 40% Italy		
PERMANENT MIGRATION BETWEEN VILLAGE AND CITY	sharp, artificial increase of rural-urban migration, between 40% to 70% out of total internal migration		systematic decrease of rural to urban migration, from 35% to 25% out of total internal migration					sharp increase of urban to rural migration as to reach more than 25% out of the total internal migration; period of negative net rural-urban migration ; high prevalence of city to village return migration								urban to rural migration is no more the dominant domestic stream. Urban to urban one starts to be dominant		
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008

Source: adaptation from D.Sandu, C.Radu, M.Constantinescu, O.Ciobanu , 2004, *A Country Report on Romanian Migration Abroad: Stocks and Flows After 1989, http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/f76c21488a048c95bc0a5f12deece153/RomanianMigrationAbroad.pdf*

One should ask several questions in connection with migration; questions that provide the social and demographic profile of the people who choose to be more mobile in terms of employment. The questions are: How many, who, how, where, what and when? [12]

[12] Dumitru Sandu, *Living abroad on a temporary basis. The economic migration of Romanians*: 1990-2006, Bucharest, November 2006, study for the Soros Foundation, Romania Before going more in-depth, one should define some of the concept that they are working with: for instance a "migration wave" is a stream of migrants that is of significant volume and variation in the context of total emigration or immigration. Romanians are an example of wave-streams due to their sudden variation in time, in specific periods; a "social world" is a life-space that is highly institutionalized, in formal or informal terms, by dominant action or thinking patters that brings a high probability of social identity (Sandu, 2009); last but not least the "migration social worlds" are those social worlds of the migrants that could be built in interaction with destination (native population at the destination, other immigrants) and origin groups (former migrants at origin, non-migrants at origin).The key reference groups in the construction of the social world of Romanian migrants in other countries: the "native" citizens, other immigrants in the respective country, returned migrants in Romania, non-migrants in Romania. (Dumitru Sandu)

Data collected throughout the years by specialists in migration, especially the studies of the sociologist Dumitru Sandu, provide us with the following portrait of Romanian emigrants:

• it is the young people, rather than the adults or the older people, who have gone to work;

• the number of men was higher than the number of women in the labour emigration;

• for the group of men aged 18 to 59, the most frequent departures have been from the rural area.

• for women, the migration residential pattern is rather different: the temporary emigration is stronger for young women aged 18 to 29 from rural areas, than women of the same age group, in urban areas; on the other hand, the temporary emigration is stronger for women aged 30 to 59 from urban areas compared to those from rural ones.

Table 4: Who left to work abroad (%)

		stages			**Total**
		1990-1995	1996-2001	2002-2006	**%**
gender	women	12	15	44	**34**
	men	88	85	56	**66**
urban	Rural	41	48	49	**48**
	Urban	59	52	51	**52**
nationality	Romanians	92	89	94	**93**
	Hungarians	8	10	4	**6**
	others		1	2	**1**
Civil status	Married	88	76	60	**66**
	Not married	7	19	31	**26**
	others	5	6	10	**7**
education	Primary	3	3	1	**2**
	Grammar	2	8	16	**13**
	Vocational and secondary	78	79	77	**77**
	University/college	17	9	7	**9**

Source: TLA survey, temporary departures to work, Dumitru Sandu

Table 5: Departures to work abroad on residential environments, age and stages

Departures from	**Age category**	**stages**			**total**
		1990-1995	1996-2001	2002-2006	**%**
Rural	15 - 29	5	12	26	21
Rural	30 – 54	31	33	23	26
Rural	55 - 64	5	3		1
Urban	15 - 29		12	22	18
Urban	30 – 54	49	39	27	32
Urban	55 - 64	10	1	2	3
		100	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: TLA (Temporarily Living Abroad Survey, 2006, Soros Foundation Romania) survey, temporary departures to work, people aged 15-64, Dumitru Sandu

As a first conclusion, the profile of the temporary worker abroad is: a young man, rather than an adult or an old one, or a young woman from a rural area and a mature woman from the town or city. Until 2002 they were mainly married men, initially more from urban areas than the country, with vocational and high-school training; the percentage of young single men started to increase after Romanians were able to travel in Europe without visas. Those who usually go to work are aged between 30 and 54 (during 1990-1995), when almost half of the migrants came from cities and towns. On average, one third of migrants are from this category, but young to middle-aged people from the rural areas also represent a quarter of the total migration. From 2002, more young people started to leave for temporary work contracts.

The early 1990s were extremely hectic for a Romanian population that was rediscovering the taste for democracy after almost half a century. The novelties were numerous, including the disappointment brought forward by the speed of the political and economic reforms, the manner in which the government coped with the demands and high expectations of the population. A new social phenomenon appeared at that time, with the character of a "social innovation", i.e. the labour emigration. Although emigration rates were still high, the economic emigration did not exceed 5% in the first 5 years after 1989. This rate increased after 1996, when the speed of the privatization process brought changes in the relationship between employers and employees. The emigration rate continued at approximately 6-7%, only to erupt after 2002, when Romanians were permitted to circulate freely in the countries of the Schengen area. Working abroad turned into a mass phenomenon, 28% being the rate of temporary migration. The preferred destinations were Italy and Spain respectively. In 2004, the number or Romanian residents in Italy, was double compared to 2003, only to reach approximately 300,000 people in 2005.

Romania's membership of the EU in 2007 has generated different migration flows from before, especially when the labour markets of Finland, Sweden, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia were immediately opened to potential applicants. The services provided by the National Agency for Employment and Labour (the public body meant to support potential applicants to search for work abroad) are not too efficient, since less than 10% of people living abroad have found jobs through this public network.[13] However, official figures, besides being scattered and uneven, highly underestimate emigration, since most of migrants do not use official-mediated channels and do not report their movements to the authorities, so analysis of this data is unreliable.

Immigration data from the main destination countries after 2007, Italy and Spain respectively, suggest a continual increase in emigration from Romania. According to the Italian National Institute for Statistics, at the end of 2007, the number of Romanians residing Italy was 1,016,000 persons, three times more than in 2006 (when it was about 340,000), making Romanians the largest foreign resident community. The situation in Spain is very similar, where the number of Romanian nationals with labour permits continued to increase in 2007. On January 1st 2008, Spanish municipal registries recorded a total of 729,000 Romanians, 38% more than in the previous year. In both Spain and Italy, however, many of those registered as

[13] http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/39/44068113.pdf

inflows in 2007 were already in the country before January 2007[14].For the time being (2009-2010), more than 700,000 Romanians work legally in Italy, but the figures are probably much higher, somewhere around 1 million.

Table 6: the evolution of vacant work places received from National Agency for Labour from the European employers, in 2009, by country[15]

Month:	*Number of received vacant work places*	*Out of these, most of the offers were received from:*	*Out of these, most of the positions were offered for the following qualifications :*
January	644	Denmark, 504	504, unqualified workers in agriculture
February	871	Spain, 850	850, unqualified workers in agriculture
March	20	Cyprus, 10	10, technicians in electronics, telecommunications
April	116	Cyprus, 57	26, electromechanics , menders for electrical equipments
May	107	Cyprus, 87	35, electromechanics , menders for electrical equipments
June	141	Germany, 80	50, doctors
July	16	France, 15	15, doctors GP
August	30	Spain, 29	28, plumbers and welders
September	30	Belgium,12	10 aluminium carpenters
October	45	Denmark, 10	10 doctors (Neuro-psychiatry, Radiology, Neurology)
November	30	UK, 22	22, au pair
December	82	UK, 68	50, unqualified workers in agriculture
Total	**2122**		

Source: Agenţia Naţională pentru Ocuparea Forţei de Muncă

Most of those (approx. 51%) who applied for jobs abroad through this EURES service[16] had primary, grammar or vocational school education; only 11.4% held a university degree, usually in the medical or IT field. The bulk of applications located came from the South of the country (the so-called „South region") , followed by the South-West and the South-East respectively (all in all, approx. 6,000 people). The capital, Bucharest, and the West of the country (Banat) gave the lowest figures in terms of job applications abroad, since these areas offer more employment opportunities compared with the rest of the country. Most positions that were obtained through these mediating services are short-term, usually un-skilled in agriculture (93%), especially in Spain.

The councillors working for EURES mention that the main obstacles confronting Romanian labourers are insufficient knowledge of the main languages of the EU, and low level of knowledge about the work and living conditions in the respective states. It is understandable that the main migratory waves from Romania head towards to Latin-speaking countries, Italy and Spain respectively, where the ability to learn the language quickly is highly probable.

[14] Table 2 shows the type of requested work from various EU countries. Spain is the biggest employer, with most of the positions in agriculture. Spanish government figures show a much higher number of Romanian labourers who are engaged in agricultural work. Back home, in Romania, they are called "căpşunari", i.e. "strawberry pickers", from "strawberry" – "căpşună".

[15] *Raport de activitate al Agentiei Nationale pentru Ocuparea Forţei de Munca pe anul 2009*

[16] EURES is the European system of job inquiries.

Different European statistics show that Romanian men as last wave emigrants are mainly construction workers. Early immigrants, such as those to Britain, are mainly employed in services. Those in the last wave of emigration to Spain are mainly employed in industry. Three quarters of the women are employed in services.

Figure 5: Evolution of nomber of people looking for a job in EU/SEE countries, that applied for a place offered the the EURES councilors, by regions, between 2007-2009



Source: Agenţia Naţională pentru Ocuparea Forţei de Muncă

Figure 6: Development regions in Romania



Data regarding the real number of migrants abroad is not easy to pull together in Romania's case – various official statistics provide contradictory data; what is known though is that Romanian immigrants represent approximately 8% of the emigration wave in the EU, second only to the Poles. In Hungary, for instance, Romanian passport holders represented, in 2006, 35% of the country's immigration. Similar figures can be met for countries such as Italy and Spain. In one of his electoral speeches, Mircea Geoană, at that time president of the Social Democratic Party, even declared that Italy and Spain are the host-countries of over 2.5 million Romanians, a "mini Romania, comparable to Slovenia". A surprising statement nevertheless, as Romanian authorities continue to send abroad an insufficient number of voting papers (approximately 620,000).

This is the reason why in the 2004 and 2008 national elections many candidates running for office realized the importance of these communities and started electoral trips to the large Romanian communities in Italy and Spain. Once with the uninominal electoral system, 4 colleges have been created for the Chamber of Deputies (1 for Europe, 1 for Asia, 1 for Africa and the Middle East, and 1 for the Americas) and 2 colleges for the Senate.

The belief that migrants are completely assimilated by their adoptive countries is rather simplistic, as migrants do maintain various ties with their home countries, including political links. The most visible aspect is voting. Under these circumstances, the expansion of voting rights to co-nationals living abroad could be translated into a less "territorial' concept regarding sense of belonging to a certain country. According to Baubock[17], this state of affairs leads to so-called "ethnic nationalism", through which voting rights are extended to the migrants' offspring. This issue is controversial nevertheless, especially since there are universal practices in the field: nations grant these rights in different ways, varying from the practice itself to their mode and scope of implementation – from local elections to national and European elections, from direct voting to voting through representatives, by post, in capital cities only or all over the territory, etc.

However, statistics show that the number of people who decide to vote is insignificant compared with the total of Romanian immigrants abroad (39,000 people in the general elections in 2004, 21,000 citizens for the EU elections, a little over 20,000 in the 2008 general elections). However, the expression that "each vote counts" seems to hold in the case of the Romanian Diaspora – President Traian Băsescu was elected in the second round of the 2009 presidential elections thanks to the votes he received from the colleges abroad, narrowly defeating the opposition.[18] This illustrates the fact that the satisfaction regarding how democracy works and the declared support for political pluralism between migrants and the population at home is far from being self-explanatory. Moreover, various surveys taken among the Romanian immigrants prove that conditions mandatory for civic involvement, such as optimism and social trust, are more present in migrants than in those who did not emigrate.

All in all, figures prove that the mobility of the Romanian electorate living or working abroad is not a very high one. For Romanians living in Florence and Rome, for instance, the main information sources are the internet and satellite TV, with programmes from Romania, followed by the Romanian media in Italy and the information campaign organized by Italy's Party of Romanians. Most of those questioned do follow political events in the home country.

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[17] Reiner Bauböck, *Migration and Citizenship. Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation,* Amsterdam University Press - IMISCOE Reports

[18] Băsescu obtained 115,831 votes, whereas his counter-candidate, the social-democrat Mircea Geoana, got only 31,045 votes, which means 79% to 21%. Most of Băsescu's votes came from the Moldovans with a Romanian citizenship (93%) and from the Romanians working in Spain (81%) and in Italy (78%).

Table 7: The age structure of the population of Romania in March 18th 2002

Age group	Population of Romania at the march 18th census 2002	The flat external migration btw. January 7th 1992 and March 18th 2002 - %	The components of the external flat migration – structure in %			
			Age group	All flat migration	The statistical recorded migration	The statistically un-registered migration
Total	100	100	**total**	100	100	100
0 – 19 years	25	15	**0 – 19 years**	15	36	11
20 – 39 years	30	62	**20 – 39 years**	62	48	65
40 -59 years	25	15	**40 -59 years**	11	1	13
60 years and over	19	8	**60 years and over**	12	15	11

Source: study by Vasile Ghetau[19] based on the data from: CNS, 1994; INS, 2003b; 2006a.

Another question that should be posed concerns direction**:** Where from /where to?
As one can see from the data presented in Table 8, between 1990 and 2006, the dominant migration direction has changed with time – there are three stages in the migration waves that began developing early in 1990. The first stage was in the early 1990s, when Israel and Turkey were the most attractive places for Romanians who intended to work abroad; except for the permanent migration of the Saxons to Germany, this country, together with Italy and Hungary were secondary destinations. Almost one fifth of the total work departures, between 1990 and 1995 headed towards Israel (places of origin and destinations Table 8). Later on, in the second stage (1996-2001), Italy became *the* leader in attracting Romanians who wanted to work abroad. Israel fell to second place in order of preference during that period. In the third stage, which began in 2002, the preferences changed again, with Italy and Spain as the most popular. The departures of the temporary labourers for Italy, during this period, were as high as 50%, the departures for Spain are at 25%.

The paths of Romanians in search of work abroad (mainly in Europe, but also in Canada and the USA) tend to concentrate on a small number of countries, not in a linear way, but following the continuation of the search:
• in the first stage, 1990 -1995, there were five main destinations with a share over 7% of the total departures i.e. Israel, Turkey, Italy, Hungary and Germany;
• in the second stage, 1996-2002, Canada and Spain were added to the five countries from the first. The social innovation was expanding towards the Western limit of the European continent and towards America.
• in the third stage, 2002 to the present, one can easily notice a bulk of the temporary work emigrations. After having tested the life and work conditions at multiple

[19] Vasile Gheţău, *Declinul demografhic al populaţiei.. O perspectivă asupra populataţiei României în secolul 21*, Editura Alpha MDN, 2007

destinations, Romanian labourers eventually decide and focus, in particular, on two Latin-language countries, Italy and Spain respectively. How much this decision has been influenced by the type of labour force demand, the ease to pass from Romanian to the language of the destination, and how much by the legislation and tolerance of the place of arrival, remains to be determined. It is highly probable though that the ease of passing the language barrier was a determinant in this choice.

The changes that occurred between these stages were not only related to the migration field. The volume of departures also changed. In the pre-Schengen period, the intensity of the phenomenon doubled compared to the 1990-1995 stage. In the period after 2001, compared to the previous one, the intensity of the phenomenon of work migration has tripled, as can be seen in the table below (e.g., in the case of Italy, the percentage moved from 26 to 76 for the people from Moldova).

Table 8: Main destinations of temporary emigration on historical regions, 1990-2001, 2001-2006

	Moldova		Muntenia		Oltenia		Dobrogea		Transylvania		Crisana-Maramures		Banat		Bucharest		Total	
	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006	1990-2001	2001-2006
Israel	26		15		7				15		57						17	
Italy	26	76	11	21	20	62	29	75	20	42	14	41		43	6	75	17	50
Hungary	3								28	17	14	6			6		9	4
Turkey	15		19		7				3								8	
Spain	3	14	7	54	13	21			13	17		29		4	6		7	24
Germany	5	1	11	8			29	13	5	3	7	3		29			6	5
Canada			7		27		14										4	
Greece			7		7	3				1				18	12	13	3	2
Belgium	4		20														2	
Serbia	3												22				2	
Austria									5				11				2	
Sweden													22				1	
France		1		1		3				3		3						2
Others	8	6	5	14	0	6	14	13	8	13	0	12	11	7	41	13	11	10
NR	13	2	4	3		6	14		5	4	7	6	33		29		11	3
	100		100		100		100		100		100		100		100		100	

Source: TLA Survey, folder with departures from work between 1990-2001 (N=168) and 2001-2006 (N=360) respectively, compilation from Dumitru Sandu

Various statistics also show that around 30,000 children accompanied their parents abroad, applying for school places in the respective countries. Half left for Italy and one third for Spain. The poorer areas, such as Moldova and Oltenia, give the profile of those emigrating to Italy, whereas Muntenia and Transylvania showed a trend towards Spain. Approximately 40% of the children were in primary school, 40 % in grammar school and 20% in secondary school. Most of the departures occurred between 2006 (10,000) and 2007 (13,000); the beginning of the economic crisis saw a decrease in departures to around 6,000[20].

[20] Sandu, op. cit. 2009

Table 9 : Migrants' children, from primary, grammar and secondary school cycles, together with their parents abroad, 2006-2008

total departures	% departures to Italy	% departures to Spain	% departures to other countries
Moldova	10,663	17	11
		72	
Oltenia	2,079	26	16
		58	
Dobrogea	1,421	34	16
		50	
Crisana-Maramures	2,132	30	32
		38	
Muntenia	6,850	45	19
		36	
Transilvania	5,844	46	21
		32	
Banat	426	28	41
		31	
Total	29,415	32	17
		51	

Sources: MECI, Dumitru Sandu

The demographic effects of the temporary migration abroad are mainly linked to the number of marriages, the birth rate and the divorce rate. An analysis performed by Dumitru Sandu[21] has found that in the villages with a high emigration rate, in a relatively short interval, of around 3 years, the following trends:

- a decreased birth rate
- increased marriage and divorce rates
- more newly-built houses/apartments
- rapid demographic aging due to the fact that second generation migrants do not return, especially when they have studied abroad.

The temporary migration also has consequences upon disparities that begin to appear between various regions and communities. Initially, the temporary migration was not a phenomenon linked to personal or community poverty. Those looking for work abroad were people of average economic condition, from villages near cities and towns, from counties with an average development rate[22]. As a consequence, the amount of support that went to the poor villages and counties was relatively low and, moreover, eventually led to an increased community and regional disparity. To be more precise: the poor areas became poorer, while the more developed ones, that benefited from remittances became, if not wealthier, at least slightly better. In terms of the results from the work abroad, the quantity of money transfers back home between 2006 and 2008, as reported by the National Bank of Romania, the sums

[21] Sandu, 2009a

[22] Dumitru Sandu, *Community selectivity of temporary emigration from Romania***,** in "Romanian Journal of Population Studies", vol I, 1-2, 2007, pp.11-45

represented an important percentage of the foreign currency that entered the country and 5% of the national budget [23](Table 10):

Table 10: The structure of private money transfers from abroad to Romania, based on expedition countries (% of the total of transfers that entered Romania)

	2006	**2007**	**2008**
Italy	34	38	38
Spain	24	29	27
UK	5	6	6
USA	12	3	5
Germany	4	5	4
Greece	3	4	3
France	2	2	2
Austria	1	2	2
Cyprus	1	1	2
Others	15	10	10
Total transfers %	100	100	100
Total transfers billions of EUROs	5 280	6 172	6 307

Source: National Bank of Romania, merged data sources

In terms of the life profiles and solutions used by the temporary labourers, a survey conducted by the Soros Foundation Romania in 2006 is highly illustrative (Tables 11 and 12):

Most of the jobs in Spain are found through relatives, whereas those in Italy through relatives and friends equally. Other percentages are given by direct application to the employer, or through intermediaries in Romania. Friends are the source of employment in the case of Hungary and Turkey; while the intermediate Romanian-based companies play an important role in employment in Israel, Greece and Germany.

Table 11: "How did you manage to find work abroad, through…." (%) (1,400 interviews)

Country where he/she worked	Contracts through the Labour Force Office	Labour intermediation companies in Romania	Relatives abroad	Friends abroad	Asking employer directly	other	NA	Total %	Total N
Spain	6	4	32	23	21	11	3	100	95
Italy	0	11	29	31	13	8	8	100	213
Hungary	3	3	27	40	13	13	0	100	30
Turkey	0	6	13	38	19	13	13	100	16
Germany	6	29	9	18	18	18	3	100	34
Israel	19	66	3	0	0	3	9	100	32
Canada	0	0	0	40	10	50	0	100	10
Greece	0	42	0	8	25	8	17	100	12
Other countries	12	14	14	14	12	27	8	100	66
Non-	4	4	0	44	19	4	26	100	27

[23] Sandu, 2009a

response									
total	4	14	21	26	14	12	8	100	535

Source: TLA survey, 1,400 household interviews with people who have worked abroad, 2006

If in Italy the importance of both relatives and friends increased after 2001, up to approximately one third each, and in Spain it can be observed that a transfer of the importance of relatives to the direct application to the employer. This is a sign of social learning by potential applicants, who began to adapt more successfully to the rules of the Western labour market (Table 12). In both cases one can notice the extremely low, most of the time non-existent, importance of Romanian institutions in providing information on available jobs in Italy or Spain. The Romanian authorities, in the last three years attempted to fill the gap, in the sense that the domestic agency meant to deal with employment (ANOFM) also provides information regarding work abroad (see Table 6 – in 2009 850 people found work in Spain through this service, although the figure is tiny compared to the real number of labourers, that reaches, according to various sources, around 1 million people).

Table 12: Ways to find a job in Italy and Spain, on stages (%)

	Time period	Contracts through labour force office	Labour intermediation companies in Romania	Relatives abroad	Friends abroad	Asking employer	others	NA	Total %	Total N
Spain	1996-2001		20	50	20	10			100	10
	2002-2006	7	2	30	24	23	11	4	100	84
Italy	1996-2001		17	21	21	13	21	8	100	24
	2002-2006		11	31	32	14	6	6	100	176

Source: TLA Survey, temporary departures to work, people aged 15 to 64

Data are proof to the fact that interpersonal connections and the mutual support have gradually created large social networks of labour migration, highly adapted to the globalization of the European economy[24]. A study conducted by the *Caritas/Migrantes*[25] association in Italy in 2007 showed that Romanians represented 15.1% of the foreign population, more than double than in the previous two years.

[24] Swanie Potot, *Romanian Circulation: Networks as informal transnational organizations,* Published in Corrado Bonifazi, Marek Okolski, Jeannette Schoorl, Patrick Simon, *International Migration in Europe. New trends and New Methods of Analysis*, Amsterdam University Press- IMISCOE, 2008, pp. 87-106

[25] http://www.dossierimmigrazione.it/romeni.htm

Table 11 Where and how did the migrant work?

		stages			total
		1990-1995	1996-2001	2002-2006	
What fields did you work in?	agriculture	14	14	16	15
	constructions	41	42	28	32
	housekeeping	0	7	28	20
	others	44	32	26	29
	NR	2	5	3	3
Did you work legally or illegally throughout this departure?	legally	53	57	31	39
	illegally	34	31	53	46
	both legally and illegally	8	7	9	8
	NR	5	6	7	6
Did you legalize your situation during that departure to work?	no, I didn't even try	68	58	53	55
	no, although I tried	0	10	28	23
	yes	12	28	13	15
	NR	20	5	6	7

Data source: TLA Survey, temporary departures to work, people aged 15 to 64.
For each question there are calculated the percentages during that stage, on columns. Example of reading: 41% of the departures to work between 1990 and 1995 were for construction work.

The TLA Survey research shows a decrease in the amount of legal work, from more than half between 1990 and 2001 to less than one third after 2002, in all sectors: agriculture, construction, housekeeping, etc. What is even more worrying is the fact that the number of people who do not even attempt to legalise their labour situation is only slowly decreasing, with over half of those questioned saying they are content with their illegal work status. At the same time, Italian researchers[26] stress the fact that the Romanian residents have a high level of education (59.2%, compared with 33.4% of the Italians).

Despite all these, integration is difficult, partly because of the inadequate migration policies, partly the lack of coherence of the European integration model, also levels of criminality of both Romanian and Italian criminal organizations and of the highly repressive measures. In many EU countries, this often chaotic legislation related to migration, both political parties and the mass media's roles in misrepresenting a complex social and cultural phenomenon, create a mutual biased perception, fear and intolerant attitudes and behaviour.

[26] Enzo Rossi, Fabrizio Botti, *Migration as a Factor of Social Innovation and Development: the Case of Romanian Migration to Italy,* Revista Inovaţia Socialş nr. 2/2010 (iulie-decembrie), p. 20

Conclusions on Romanian emigration

Romanian emigration has a long and painful history. Confronted with either political or economic hardships, sometimes both, people fled the country both legally and illegally, making exact figures almost impossible to asses. It is also true that the permanent migration continued to decrease after 1991, but only to allow another new social phenomenon: temporary migration with the main purpose of working abroad to support financially the families at home.

Sociologists have noticed a powerful "wave effect" that influences the attitudes and behaviour of Romanian emigrants. Often this is more relevant than the place of origin of these people, although certain patterns of migration have been identified through the years (mostly people from the South, not necessarily from the poorest areas, etc). People of the last wave, the newcomers (as is the case of Romanians in Spain and Italy) tend to be younger, less adapted to the immigrant society – that is why they are ethnically labelled, even if most of their characteristics are due to being latecomers. Although these communities are more tolerant towards the Romanians, various violent incidents have led to a less positive assessment of all the workers from the country. One can notice the formation of "Romanian towns", not only in the southern European countries, but also in the UK or France, who are more open to the Romanian skilled professionals.

The key lines of differentiating social worlds of immigrants in are the waves of immigration and also ethnicity and place of origin. These social worlds of immigration are again separated into various sub-worlds mainly represented by the levels of education, income and family situation. The life strategies of the Romanian migrants are redefined on a continuous basis in terms of family, use of status resources and context evaluations (as job opportunities and performance of the institutions at home compared with host societies)[27]. Belonging to a 'Romanian group' or to 'a Romanian migrant group of workers' is alleged only when migrants clearly identify another population/social category that they wish to be seen apart from. For example, Romanian Roma, highly stigmatized by the majority Romanian population, represent a real threat to the identity of the other Romanian migrants. The attitude is explicable by the fact that many western societies often perceive Romanian migration as being a Roma activity, with the consequence of middle-class Romanians being regarded abroad as Roma.[28] The corollary is that social networks play a highly important role in the creation of these worlds and sub-worlds of the migrants.

[27] Dumitru Sandu, *Social Worlds of the last wave immigrants: the case of Romanians in Spain,* presentation at the international seminar "Migration Flows among South East Europe, Spain and Catalonia", Autonomous University of Barcelona, 21-23 September 2009

[28] Potot, op. cit. p. 7

Immigration to Romania after 1989

Inflows of migrants to Romania remain modest compared to western standards. According to official data from various sources, the number of immigrants in Romania fell slightly in 2007, in order to increase in the next two years.[29] In 2007, the total number of foreign citizens (either from third countries and EU/EEA) with valid permits amounted to 49,775, 4,225 less than in 2006. However, the number of persons with permanent permits rose by about 18% (from 5, 429 in 2006, to 6, 652 in 2007). The main origin countries of temporary migrants remained Moldova (11,852), Turkey (6,227) and China (4,336). Temporary residents from EU/EEA come mainly from Italy, Germany and France. Most of the permanent migrants originate from China (1,070), Turkey (976), and Syria (757). As far as the number of work permits granted to foreigners is concerned, official data from the Romanian Office for Immigration (created in 2007), 3, 638 work authorizations (as work permits were renamed) were issued to foreigners in the second half of 2007, with a high increase in 2008 (14,389 work permits – see Figure 9), only to decrease to the level of 2005 (approximately 4,000 work permits) in 2009. The applicants are mainly Turkish citizens (49%), followed by Chinese (17%) and Moldavians (15%). Both in terms of number of authorizations granted, and of countries of origin, the situation is stable. About 74% of the work authorizations issued in the second half of 2007 were for permanent workers, 21% for posted workers (Figures 8, 9, 10, 11, Table 14).

Under the National Strategy on Immigration for 2007-2010, administrative procedures regarding the employment and posting of foreigners have been simplified, and special procedures now apply for admission of highly skilled third-country nationals. During 2008, 10,000 new work authorizations were issued to non-EU nationals as posted workers employed by foreign entities. An action plan with the purpose of encouraging the return of Romanian citizens was initiated in 2007 and adopted at the beginning of 2008 by a Government Decision.

[29] Combined sources : http://www.insse.ro/cms/rw/pages/index.ro.do , http://www.mai.gov.ro/engleza/english.htm http://ori.mai.gov.ro/

Figure 7: The evolution of the number of immigrants in Romania



In the first quarter of 2009, almost 60% of the total numbers of non-EU aliens holding the right of residence in Romania were from three countries: Moldova (28%), Turkey (17%) and China (14%). Region-wise, the countries of the Near East represent the main source of immigration to Romania. Almost one out of three aliens with legal residence in Romania comes from this region.[30]

Data from the various waves of the European values Survey and the World Values Survey[31] show that in 2008 in favour of discrimination on the labour market seem to be more widespread as compared to 2005 (69% compared to 65%) although more Romanians (23%) adopt a position against discrimination according to this criterion (in the 1993-2005 interval only 14-15% were against discrimination). Those who still support discrimination on the labour market are people close to retirement or even retired (the 60-80 year old age group), with basic education and from small villages/communes. The data support the theories according to which the lack of direct and frequent contact with foreigners (favoured in this case by the residence milieu), the low mobility (favoured by old age) and the low educational level are determinant factors for foreigners' discrimination.

If we look at the previous waves of the EVS/WVS and at the European average from 1999 (15%), in 2008 the tolerance of Romanians towards the immigrants/foreign

[30] Iris Alexe (ed.), *Immigrants' Information Needs in* Romania, Soros Foundation Romania research report, Raluca Popescu, Georgiana Toth, November 2009, p. 8
[31] Newsletter, *Valorile românilor*, No. 6, september 2009, http://www.iccv.ro/valori

labourers is comparable to other European countries; if in certain countries (Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Estonia) the tolerance level is almost unchanged, in other countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands) intolerance is increasing trend, whereas in countries such as Romania, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia) it is decreasing (from 33% in 1993, to 21% in 1999, to 17% in 2005). As far as discrimination related to the work place is concerned, Romania presents a rather discriminatory attitude, both in 2005 and in 2008; although in 2005 there also was a high percentage of undecided (20%). This aspect is in line with another trend identified through these surveys, i.e. that the emotional attitude is one of the main explanatory variables for one's identity, less than the civic attitude. What is important though is that, in order to obtain Romanian citizenship, for instance, the fact of being born in Romania and having Romanian ancestors is more important than having lived in the country or respecting the political institutions and laws.

If the relation of the immigrants with Romanian institutions is characterized by most of the immigrants living in Romania as having problems, living with Romanians, interacting with them during the everyday life is usually positively evaluated. On the other hand, the substance debates led by the researchers of the Soros Foundation Romania revealed rather the contrary. In reality, Romanians' attitude towards aliens (and other races in particular) is assessed as a rather closed one, stereotyped and revealing a high level of discrimination. As a consequence, most of the immigrants, in particular those from very different cultures, tend to isolate themselves, living in closed communities resulting in integration problems. The need for information is actually experienced by both – immigrants and the domestic population. In addition to the fact that aliens should know the habits and beliefs of the Romanians, and adapt to their culture, Romanians too should know and respect the values and identity of the immigrant cultures. The cultural differences should be known, understood and respected in an open and tolerant society.[32]

Figure 8: Temporary immigrants in Romania, 2008-2009

[32] Alexe, op. cit., pp. 44-45



Source: combined, calculations of the author

As one can see in the figures presented below, the data and statistics dealing with immigration and asylum seekers are highly unequal. The phenomenon of migration has a somewhat complicated dynamic, since it must adapt itself to continuously changing circumstances, challenges and vulnerabilities. One of the main issues, identified by various reports in the field, are related to the need of co-ordinating domestic legislation and practices to the wider practices of the European Union member states, both in managing the labour force and the flows of communication and information respectively. Another issue is the need to correlate the management of national and regional labour force mobility.[33]

Romania expects an increase in the number of immigrants in the coming years, especially after it joins the Schengen. Nevertheless, a fact that the authorities must cope with is that this "attractiveness" will be the same for both legal and illegal immigrants, requiring an increase in human and in technological know-how. Another challenge is complying with the various rights and freedoms of different categories of immigrants (minor asylum seekers, victims of human trafficking and labour exploitation, immigrants coming for work purposes); this would mean support for people with special needs, social and legal assistance, health care, housing, employment, language course, etc. Last but not least, the public discourse on immigration in Romania must avoid creating or enforcing the stereotypes and negative representations of immigrants among the population, a state of affairs confirmed by public opinion polls conducted by the Institute for the Quality of Life.[34]

Table 14: Sources of foreign workers in Romania 2005 - 2006

[33] Iris Alexe (ed.), *Gestionarea benefică a imigraţiei în România*, Soros Foundation Romania 2010, pp. 168-169

[34] Newsletter, Valorile românilor, No. 6, septembrie 2009, http://www.iccv.ro/valori

	Year	
Country	**2005**	**2006**
1. Turkey	1,481	1,721
2. China	529	1,129
3. France	155	310
4. Germany	55	200

Source" Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reforms" (MIRA) (2007)

Figure 9: Number of released work permits in Romania 2004 -2009



Source: http://ori.mai.gov.ro/detalii/pagina/ro/Statistici-si-publicatii/147, design OVS

Some of these immigrants are refugees, their numbers remaining almost unchanged between 2007 and 2009, despite the fears of the officials and analysts' predictions that these figures would increase once Romania officially joined the EU (Figure 12, Table 14). Most come from third-party countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, China, Iraq, Syria), but also from Western countries, such as the USA, Italy, France and Germany. In the case of Western countries, it is generally the development of multinational firms that generates this inflow of people settling, even if only for a few years in Romania, mainly in Bucharest, but also in other cities, such as Cluj, Constanta and Timisoara (Figure 11). Although not a representative sample, this trend can be observed in the request for Romanian language classes that are provided mainly in Bucharest (by the Romanian Cultural Institute ICR) and in Cluj (by the Romanian Language Institute of Cluj University). Starting with 2008, ICR increased its offer of courses from semester to semester, reaching approximately 350 per year, mainly for people from multinationals, diplomats, graduate students, translators and interpreters and also their spouses.

Figure 10: Asylum in Romania 1991-2006

Source: Ministerul Internelor şi Reformei Administrative (MIRA), Autoritate pentru Străini (ApS)

Table 15: Number of refugees and application for asylum 2008-2009

	Year		
	2007	**2008**	**2009**
Number of refugees	1,658	1,757	1,596
Applications for asylum	659	1,172	835

Source: Gestionarea beneficе a imigratiei in Romania, Iris Alexe (ed.), Soros Foundation Romania 2010

As is seen in Tables 15 and 16, the data regarding the number of asylum applications is contradictory, one potential explanation being that the sources are from various institutions, Romanian and international as well. One solution could be to create a coherent system of registration for the data regarding individuals who settle or transit Romania.

Table 16: Applicants for asylum in Romania – the first 10 nationalities

2008		**2009**		**2010***	
Pakistan	252	Republic of Moldova	136		
Bangladesh	172	Pakistan	92		
India	141	Afghanistan	87		
Iraq	133	Turkey	82		
Turkey	79	Iraq	71		
China	53	China	61		
Georgia	43	India	41		
Cameron	25	Bangladesh	41		
Serbia	25	Georgia	26		
Republic of Moldova	15	DR Congo	23		
Total	**938**	**Total**	**639**		**398**

*Source: Gestionarea beneficе a imigratiei in Romania, Iris Alexe (ed.), Soros Foundation Romania 2010, apud. UN Refugee Agency in Romania, *http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48df96.html , as of January 2010 – total residing in Romania 1,773*

Half of third-country citizens who were granted the right of temporary residence in Romania in 2009 either had a family member who is Romanian citizen or had come to study. Employment in Romania was the purpose of being granted the right of residence in the case of only 16% of the non-EU citizens.[35]

Figure 11: Distribution of immigrants in Romania according to their purpose of stay and the location





Source: Romanian Immigration Office, data reported on 30.06. 2009

35

Immigration has a high territorial concentration. 41% of aliens with the right of residence are in Bucharest, whereas other 33% live in counties including the main urban settlements: Iaşi, Cluj, Constanţa, Timiş, Galaţi, Prahova. 80% of the immigrants are, in practice, concentrated in Bucharest and in 9 other counties.

Figure 12: The territorial concentration of immigrants in Romania in 2009



Source: Romanian Immigration Office, data reported on 30.06. 2009

The main sources of information used by immigrants are those relying on the relational capital of the immigrant - kinship and friendship networks, ethnical and religious affiliation. In terms of information accessibility, the public institutions are experiencing most of the problems. The third-country nationals in Romania are in critical need of information, as experienced from the very first moments of their

arrival to Romania, at the point of entry and where the immigrants are faced with the lack of information about public transportation.[36]

General Conclusion

The Romanian migration changed from a circulatory flow, in the 1990s, to a cyclical and not permanent phenomenon. Migrants from Romania move, most of the time, to compensate for the economic crisis. The biggest migrant communities, from Italy and Spain, are usually made up of workers with previous experience not only of external migration, but also internal migration, generated by the two internal domestic migration flows: one from the late 1980s, when the communist regime moved hundreds of thousands of people from the countryside to the outskirts of the big cities, and the second flow, when the closedown of many industrial sites created an inverse flow, from the urban to the rural areas, especially in the North-East of Romania.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fears of the developed EU countries, no uncontrolled migration from Romania took place after 2007, in spite of the increase with 150% of the residence permits for Romanians in a country like Italy.[37] The migration flows from Romania indicate, despite all concerns, a potential pattern of integration in Europe: a circular, professional migration that is able to generate a type of "horizontal cultural exchange" and new concept of European citizenship. The migration balance shall, most probably, re-equilibrate itself when not only the success stories will circulate back home, but also those of failures. History, as well as migration, is more cyclical than we think – it is also possible that the economic crisis will generate an inverse phenomenon, of an increased nationalism, translated into a decrease of the migration flow.

As far as immigration to Romania is concerned, what is noticeable is that most of the foreigners with a legal status come, overwhelmingly, from Moldova and they usually

[36] Alexe, ibidem, p. 43
[37] Rossi & Botti, op. cit, p. 19

settle in the capital, Bucharest, where most of the work permits are released, but also the return decisions were issued by the Romanian authorities.

The Romanian state began to be more interested in the issue of migration starting in 2004-2005, when several organisations were set up to deal with the potential inflows – from a simple condemnation of illegal migration, a step has been taken to respond to the migrants' needs in order to know, protect, regulate and guarantee their rights. However, there is still much to be done until issues such as the impossibility of hiring refugees and asylum applicants in their first year in the country remains unsolved. Moreover, the recognition of degrees other than the ones from the EU countries is still a problem for foreigners who settle in Romania looking for a job.

Another issue that is linked to the migration is the opportunity provided to the temporary workers abroad to re-integrate in their home country on their return, since their un-conditional return is not possible, nor desirable, especially since the emigration policy is not correlated with the regional and community development policies in Romania.

Migration in Europe: Case Studies: Bulgaria & Romania
Chairman: Philip Hanson
Discussion Leaders: Krassen Stanchev, Oana-Valentina Suciu
Discussion

Silvana Malle: I have a question about remittances; you both mentioned that remittances are very high, but I wonder if they are even higher. What is the situation in Bulgaria and Romania? I know about Moldova, because a number of Moldavians work in northern Italy, women as housekeepers for example, and I know how they send money home – nobody uses the post office or banks. They have these mini-buses which carry people around Italy, they give a small percentage of the money to the driver and are sure the driver will deliver the money, and none of this is recorded.

Oana-Valentina Suciu: The data I have used came from the National Bank of Romania, so probably the remittances are even higher. You can see this in the huge houses that they build, with 20 rooms for example, just to show off.

Silvana Malle: But in this case you are talking about gypsies?

Oana-Valentina Suciu: No, Romanians as well.

Silvana Malle: I have been to Romania and Bulgaria, and just the structure of a gypsy house is completely different from any other, because of numerous decorations. Entire regions are like this. Are you talking about this?

Oana Valentina Suciu: I am talking about whole villages in Moldova, Bukovina, and the latter used to be a wealthy region and now they are even richer. There you will see the newest and most expensive cars and houses in Europe.

Phil Hanson: This is a way for the immigrants to send assets back home, and you say a lot of this goes into houses. Presumably, if the banking system and the financial markets were much more open, flexible, efficient and trusted, more of these assets would be built up as financial assets. You are saying they are making a choice of sending them unofficially.

Krassen Stanchev: Although these figures are large for Bulgaria and Romania, they are not as high as in Central Asia, where in Tajikistan remittances make up 40% of GDP. The point is that Bulgaria and Romania have benefits from remittances, but they are not dependent on remittances. Although I recalculated that for this year remittances by the end of August 2010, are equal to 125% of FDI. This is because of the bad economic policies of the Finance Minister, Simeon Djankov, and especially the Prime Minister. The government started reshuffling the economic influence, which immediately frightened the foreign investors' community and delayed a project in the pipeline; and only those who had invested heavily in the mines and factories stayed in the country.

The fact is that FDI dropped from 30% of GDP in 2007 to nil this year (2010), because of the previous socialist government and current populist government. As to the not so transparent transfers, we can speculate and indeed we were speculating in Bulgaria about this; if we use the contracting tacit money methodology, I believe that unregistered transfers would be somewhere at the level of 15% to 20% of total remittances. Otherwise, both the Central Banks - Romania's and Bulgaria's - count remittances as net private transfers; I mean you have credit from abroad and debit notes to foreign countries. The methodology used to be reliable until the beginning of 2010. Then, I do not remember why, the EU changed one of the banking regulations and currently banks are not required to report international transfers of less than 50,000 Euros, which means none of the immigrants' transfers needs to be recorded. However, the Bulgarian Central Bank had an agreement with the banks to report these transfers, so Bulgarian data is relatively reliable. A study from 2004 is being repeated by our colleague, who reviewed tax incentives and rates, and I think it will confirm the findings from 2004 and what I managed to update.

Jan Fidrmuc: Following the topic of remittances, it is not obvious that they are a good thing; Oana mentioned that they channel the money into building new houses. As long as remittances finance consumption, and in this case building a house is consumption; it does not necessarily make a country richer in the long-term. It makes the individual obscenely rich, in a way which they like to show off, but it would be much more productive if they transferred remittances into new businesses. I was wondering to what extent that helps to build up the productive base of the country, rather than just help families increase their consumption.

Oana-Valentina Suciu: There are no studies yet, related to this. There is a study done by Professor Sandu, who compiled this index, which is the Home-return intention, and what he discovered is that they should do as you say and invest in businesses, if they have the intention to return. The problem is that they do not really intend to.

Jan Fidrmuc: So why do they send money back?

Oana-Valentina Suciu: Because they still have elderly parents or children to support and that is an issue I did not touch in my presentation; the social and emotional problems that these children back home are facing, because they are usually left with old grandparents.

Krassen Stanchev: There are many surveys on what happens to remittances, I do not believe that Romanian immigrants are so irrational. In Bulgaria there are older papers by ethnologists and anthropologists. My own experience with clients from areas populated by Turk- the companies I work with come from these regions show that the first recipients are relatives or parents. The next direction is business; the Turks like everyone in Bulgaria, invest in real estate. It depends on many factors, but up to 10%

of real estate in big cities is funded by remittances from Bulgarian workers abroad. What is also important is the level of independent transfers, and in Bulgaria and Romania they held surveys every five years. The family transfer is as high as 25% of the income of the family. This should be compared with the taxes on labour and healthcare and those areas. In Bulgaria, the overall level of direct taxes is relatively low; income tax and corporate tax is flat at 10%, but the social taxes, are at the level of 20% and 22% of the income. So if you have a level of the family income redistribution of 25%, then you think twice whether you want to give the Finance Minister 50% or to give your family 25% without giving what the law requires to the treasury. Therefore, many of the choices are absolutely rational.

Jan Fidrmuc: I would not say it is irrational; it may be perfectly rational to build a house with twenty rooms if it gives you a social status. And it might be perfectly rational to spend money on a nice car or DVD player than hay or some kind of investment, but it has different economic implications. This seems to be the case in most countries which have large emigration communities. Having a steady inflow of remittances does not necessarily decrease the growth rate of the home country, because much of it goes to consumption rather than investment. Having 3% or 4% in remittances does not necessarily mean the country will become prosperous. Even if it is consumption, it will account for the growth. This was associated with Dutch disease: cash inflow from mineral resources; oil and gas. The argument is that if you get a steady inflow of Euros or Dollars, in order to spend them in Romania you have to convert them into the local currency, so it tends to appreciate. And this diminishes the ability of the country to become richer.

Krassen Stanchev: This is very detailed and probably a valuable argument, but there is no analogy between Dutch disease and remittances. The second thing is a regulatory argument; in Bulgaria and Romania you may sign loans and make deposits in any currency such as Mongolian tugriks, so it depends on your contract with the bank. It is not illegal and there is a small appreciation of the Lev, but it is marginal.

Tomasz Mickiewicz: I hear the argument about Dutch disease quite often in Poland, I hear about people being unhappy about remittances coming to Poland. The problem is that there is something more than remittances. In principle, there should be nothing wrong with having a lot of consumption financed by money from abroad. The real problem is the next step, which is the risk pattern. This is the same problem that oil-dependant countries such as Azerbaijan have; this is a very risky path of development, because they are putting all their eggs in one basket. The real question is whether the flow of remittances is stable or not. If it is stable, it will continue for the next twenty years, but it may not be stable. It is unlikely to be stable, given that patterns of migration are volatile; people will come back, stay and stop sending money back because they will settle. That is the real question.

Natasha Srdoc: Another problem is the poor institutional standards in these countries.

Krassen Stanchev: I looked at anecdotal stories of remittances being used in Georgia, in very beautiful areas in the mountains, similar to Bled. People were trying to start a business, and according to World Bank indicators Georgia is one of the best countries to do business in. When I asked Georgians coming back from abroad, who were trying to build a hotel, why they have trouble doing it, they simply said they do not know what the government will do with their rent contract next year. If they come and take their properties, what will they do? So, people do have a business culture, I do not think it is a cultural issue, but an institutional one. In Bulgaria, the period of growing remittances coincided with growing investment. The investment in Bulgaria, as a share of GDP, between 1998 and 2008 was 25%. And, irrespective of the behaviour of remittances, FDI steadily increased.

John H. Moore: I would like to turn the discussion slightly away from remittances, but it seems to me the question is who decides on the uses of remittances. If somebody goes abroad, gets a job and they want to send money home, they ought to be able to do that and they ought to be send it for whatever use they desire; that is the nature of a liberal society. The real question comes from Natasha; what are the institutions like? It seems that institutions which are good for channelling remittances into investment are also good for the development of domestic investment as well. So, if you want to have good institutions, then they should be the same as the ones for the protection of private property, taxation etc. The question is who decides on the uses of the remittances.

Tomasz Mickiewicz: I agree this is a concern, but the problem is about institutions and policies, and the discussion went in this direction. If you have a country which relies so much on the inflow of capital; either remittances or borrowing abroad, this is an indicator that there is something problematic in the country and the policymakers are not happy that much of the development is financed by the fact that people feel attached to their families of origin. The reason why we look at what is financed by remittances is not that we would like to restrict that, but it indicates there is not enough capital created within the country. They should have a more developed banking sector and capital coming into it. Typically the financial sector is underdeveloped in those countries where we see that.

Bob Reilly: I know the situation in Central and Latin America anecdotally, because so many workers come from those countries as remittance workers. You find examples of people working as maids sending money back home so their relatives can have maids. They use money in this fashion, because there is no productive way to use it.

Philip Hanson: That is why I am not entirely convinced by John's argument that the institutions are a piece. I think you could have a very effective informal network which could efficiently transfer remittances from A to B, without the country in which B is located having the institutions to make good use of those firms.

Steve Pejovich: But how do you define these institutions?

John Baker: I studied this problem in Central America, where the banks wanted to receive remittances, but were not allowed. The US government would much prefer remittances to go through banks than Western Union, for example.

Krassen Stanchev: For that matter, Serbia and Croatia nationalised the savings of the Yugoslav Gastarbeiters. When people were working a lot they were transferring the money to the banks and suddenly Milosevic and Tudjman came and they nationalised the savings.

Tomasz Mickiewicz: This had a disastrous effect on the financial sector in Serbia.

Jan Fidrmuc: In the Croatian case, where people had savings in foreign currency and put them in bank accounts, suddenly the Euro was introduced and all these Deutsch Marks became worthless. They had to open their accounts and deposit them, and somehow a large portion of their savings was left with the banks, apparently. Some people did not trust the banks and withdrew the money, but a lot decided not to move their money.

Krassen Stanchev: By the time this happened, most of the banks were owned by foreign institutions and the government had no say in how they should behave.

Jan Fidrmuc: Until the adoption of the Euro, people were keeping their savings in their drawers and under mattresses.

Natasha Srdoc: But this was a precedent with Slovenia's Ljubljanska Banka, because it refused to return any deposits to Yugoslav countries and it became a transition problem.

Jan Fidrmuc: So they refused to pay out deposits to non-Slovenes?

Krassen Stanchev: They nationalised foreigners' accounts.

Matej Kovac: The fact is that Ljubljanska Banka has branches in all the republics and they claimed it is territorial principle, because each bank was responsible for each country. In all other republics apart from Croatia, the branches of Ljubljanska Banka were separate, but in Croatia it was a branch of the central offices. This issue is now being resolved by the European Court of Human Rights. All of the Croatians who sued Ljubljanska Banka lost their cases.

Silvana Malle: After listening to the discussion one could come to the conclusion that remittances are a negative thing. However, I have seen these poor people from Eastern Europe working hard and sending money back home to their elderly relatives so that they can enjoy better living conditions. Therefore, I think that people who argue that remittances are a bad thing, should provide robust evidence to prove it.

Philip Hanson: I do not think anyone at the table was arguing that, but we can come back to it later. Would any of the speakers like to add something?

Krassen Stanchev: I would like to finish with two points: the first one is that the very decision to emigrate is related to a mobilisation of resources and is very positive for growth. People start learning a foreign language and those sorts of things. The second thing is also important, and for Bulgaria it is also proven. In 1999, during the Kosovo crisis, we did some research on the impact of refugees on their hosts. It so happened that we did not have many refugees from Kosovo and Serbia: we had nine families from Serbia and 90 from Kosovo, but compared to the bulk of the refugees, they were from Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries. The impact of refugees from those countries plus Kosovo and Serbia, was entirely positive. So, whatever they received from the Bulgarian welfare system, was but a fraction of what they put in. The refugees came with their own money and it was five times more than the Bulgarian Government was spending on maintaining them; border police, camps, welfare etc.

Oana-Valentina Suciu: As Krassen said, this is a process of resource mobilisation and a process of social learning as well; both for the countries which receive these migrants and their countries of origin. What we are dealing with now, at least in the case of Romania, is not a horizontal type of migration any longer, when people leave for good. It is a type of circulatory migration and my guess is that, at the end, when not only the success stories, but also those who failed will return home, this will be transferred in a social type of learning, in which people mobilise their resources to have a better life in their home countries, as well as abroad.

Islam in the Western Balkans - primarily in Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo

Chairman: Tomasz Mickiewicz
Discussion leaders: Bernard Brscic, Joel Anand Samy & Natasha Srdoc

Bernard Brscic: I want to address the development of Islamic proliferation in the Balkans. For those in the west, it is the accepted story that Yugoslavia's disintegration is connected only with rising nationalism. But one of the salient characteristics, in my view, is the rise of Islamic ideology, at least in the case of Bosnia. The three countries we shall talk about are Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo, but each country has a different story. I think that the situation in Albania and Kosovo is somewhat different (although the religious structure is such that one could certainly discuss the prevalent Islamic impact). For example, in Kosovo the issue is of the unresolved national problem of the 'Greater Albania', so in a way it could be addressed in the usual language of Yugoslavia's disintegration. However, in Bosnia we are witnessing a very different phenomenon, mainly an attempt to establish a kind of Islamic state. I will not go into the historical development, or the interpretation of how the Bosnian tragedy happened, but my point is that to a great extent the disintegration and the problems in Bosnia today can be explained through the increasing impact of Islamist ideology.

The received story, and this is also in ex-Yugoslavia, is that Bosnia (during Yugoslavia's existence) used to be a multicultural society; a paragon of multiculturalism with three or four religions living together, particularly in Sarajevo. Those who visited the city saw within a very small area, Catholic and Orthodox churches, mosques and even some synagogues. Bosnia used to be considered as an example of tolerance, but those of us who are aware of some history during the communist regime know this is a lie. The religious problem was not solved at all, nor was the national problem, and Bosnia was the place where communist oppression (in ex-Yugoslavia) was the harshest, the most Stalinist. The communists actually tried to quench the national religious tensions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the bloodiest clash occurred in Bosnia in 1992, although in the West it was presented as a simple case of Serbian nationalist 'ethnic cleansing' innocent Bosnians. Interestingly enough, for cultural studies, the nationhood of Bosnians was somehow socially constructed from the religious point of view, because we do not have in Europe (at least to my knowledge) a nationality whose salient characteristic is its religion. So my point is that in Bosnia there was not only a national conflict between Serbs, Croats and Muslims but also this Islamist element that was present from the start. Bosnia's first president, Alija Izetbegovic, was a well-known Islamic scholar and had been imprisoned in ex-Yugoslavia for designing and establishing an Islamic Jamahiriya in Bosnia.

Now, through this conflict between the Croats and the Serbs, this Islamism somehow strengthened in Bosnia. In addition there was outside interference namely the Muhajadeen and other fighters from Islamic countries who joined the Muslims against the Serbs and Croats. To some extent, one is puzzled how a rather mild version of Sunni Islam in Bosnia, before the war, has developed in the last twenty years into an almost semi-Islamic state. It is less puzzling when one recalls the financial support of Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries.

Perhaps it is due to a guilty conscience that the European Union and the United States turns a blind eye to the transformation of this country and the obvious attempts at altering the Dayton Agreement and centralizing the country[38]. To the eyes of an outsider, this is in the interest of Bosnian Muslims who are now transforming the decentralized state that would be controlled by the Muslim majority. At first, from the point of influence one has to mention Turkey, which is playing an increasingly important part in the Balkans. Historically, it was the major force in the Balkans and now because of its strengthening economy and respectable international status, Turkey is playing an important part in Bosnia and in a way supporting the Muslim attempts to centralize the government. Of course, besides the Sunni influence of Turkey, one should mention the very negative impact of the Wahabi, Saudis. They are not only financing religious institutions but also the reconstruction of Bosnia's demolished mosques. Most importantly, however, Wahabism is becoming the influence in certain educational establishments. Through the infiltration of Islamic attempts, the Wahabi version is especially important. There is this negative trend of Islamisation in Bosnia.

In my view, Turkey's role, in particular, is a destabilizing force in Bosnia, and I am afraid that neither the EU nor the Americans have any idea what to do about it. Somehow because of the Srebrenica effect, if I can express it that way, they are turning a blind eye to the fact that Bosnia is a failed state, and it will pose huge problems for the EU -- a kind of European cul-de-sac. The problem with Bosnia is that the West does not apply the same rules of the game as it applied to Kosovo, for example.

Of course, Kosovo is a different problem, but the recent ruling by the International Court of Justice that somehow acknowledges the right of independence for Kosovo, and that somehow the Kosovars were able to declare a second national state of Albanians is a *sui generis*, and one cannot deny the right of Serbs, either in northern Kosovo or in Republika Srpska, to declare independence. If we do want to uphold international law, then the same rules should apply, and given that there is a European people, like Albanians, who are allowed to have two independent states, why should not the Serbs, or the Catalans, or the Basques, or the Scots have the same right of independence?

Thus in the Balkans these very interesting experiments are taking place in the field of international law, and thus international law is being (in my view), breached. As I mentioned, one has to discern that this is not an issue of Islamic expansion in Kosovo and Albania, as the project of Greater Albania (to my knowledge) is nothing to do with the expansionist Islamism. But the attempts in Bosnia give cause for concern, and especially now in the region of Sandjak – a small area between Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia with a Muslim majority,.

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[38] See: Corrupted Political Elites or Mafiotic State Structures? The Case of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Dunja Larise, HUMSE Journal, Issue 3
www.graz.at/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Journal/dunnja_larise_final_version.pd
see also: Getting Back on Track in Bosnia-Herzegovina - October 20102 Aug 2010 **...** relevant in the three-way contest against Bakir Izetbegovi**c**, the son of Alija Izetbegovi**c**, and the media-mogul Fahrudin **...** www.thewashingtonquarterly.com/10october/docs/10oct_Chivvis_Dogo.pdf

I believe that the West should deal not only with the question of expanding Islamism in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in the way the enemy of the great society is already within the gates and these gates are in Bosnia. There is a kind of parallel society, with villages around Sarajevo that are basically inhabited by the Muhajadeen, who (at least one reads this) apply sharia law and in a way exerting pressure on the Serbs to force them to live in a unified state that would not only exhibit centralizing tendencies, but is about to fail. The possible alternative of course would be the return to the 'Switzerland project' of 1993, which would transform Bosnia along the Swiss lines, with the introduction of cantons and transform it into a decentralized state without a strong central government.

The current trends are in the opposite direction. Both the EU and United States are behind the Muslim tendency to centralize Bosnia and I am very much afraid that if the West's policy does not change in the region, we shall face huge problems in the future.

Joel Anand Samy Thank you very much for this opportunity to share a few thoughts; it is truly a relevant discussion. The issues of Islam and radical Islam are not only top news in Europe but also in the United States, as we have witnessed with the developments in Manhattan and also in some of the smaller communities across America. It is also interesting to realise that on the eve of this colloquium here, The Washington Post published an article, 'Radical Islam is rising in the Balkans', by Constantine Testoritis, a writer with Associated Press. In one of his paragraphs he states that 'the Balkans is a breeding ground for terrorists, with easy access to the EU'. My observations are based on my previous experiences in the region in the 1990s as an executive for a foundation that provided tremendous assistance to the region and also a private initiative that Dr David Roth and I formed. He was a senior adviser to General Colin Powell during the efforts that led to the pushing back of Saddam's troops into Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait.

For our discussion today, I would like to draw your attention to Dr Samuel Huntington's thoughts on this very issue. Dr Huntington, the author of *The Clash of Civilizations* had relayed the following:

"It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world."

I am inclined to share parts of Dr. Huntington's speech delivered on February 4th 1999, at Colorado College.

"Nonetheless major forces are at work producing changes in relative power. These include the demographic stagnation and economic slowdown of the West, on the one hand, and the economic growth of East Asian societies and the demographic dynamism of Islamic societies on the other. Third, in this new world, the relations between states from different civilizations will normally be distant and cool and often highly antagonistic. While ad hoc coalitions may exist at times across civilization boundaries, intercivilizational relations are more likely to be described by such terms as competitive coexistence, cold war, and cold peace. The term "cold war," la guerra fria, it is interesting

to note, was invented by thirteenth century Spaniards to describe their relations with their Muslim neighbours, and the world is now likely to be a world of many cold wars."

Samuel Huntington continued:

"In this new world, the most dangerous form of violent conflict would be core state wars between the major states of different civilizations. The principal sources of these two forms of conflict and hence of political instability during the next quarter century will be the resurgence of Islam and the rise of China. The relations of the West with these challenger civilizations - Islam and China - are likely to be particularly difficult and antagonistic. The potentially most dangerous conflict is that between the United States and China."

And Dr. Huntington has further intriguing thoughts as well. Please bear in mind that these opinions were stated in February of 1999, prior to the events of September 11th 2002.

The Balkan region he cited is also where the East has violently confronted the West. These events began in the 14th century - and shaped this part of the world in ways that may not be noticeable to the Western eye. And herein lies what he calls one of the main civilizational fault-lines. Over the past two decades, this perceived fault-line has been exploited by many, including individuals like the infamous Osama Bin Laden. It is important to remember that Bin Laden himself was an engaged participant who raised funds for the cause in Bosnia and helped to train soldiers. There are reports that Bin Laden was seen in the Balkans. He not only recruited and sent soldiers, he also brought a more dangerous element - radical Islam's ideology to the Balkan region. It is also reported that he also worked very closely, interestingly enough, with individuals in Croatia. During the time of the UN arms embargo being enforced, Bin Laden and his cohorts had to work out a deal with Croatia's then established leadership in order to bring weapons into Bosnia. You can imagine the unsavoury relations that were established then.

Followers of radical Islam, such as Bin Laden, remember the fact that the Turks gained control of Bosnia in 1643 and their failed historic attempts to conquer Europe. Al Qaeda operatives in Bosnia grew to four thousand because they were training military personnel. The Dayton Accord signed fifteen years ago this November stated that the imported Muhajadeens were illegal. However, Sarajevo's government provided Bosnian passports to most of them. According to reports, 3000 people in Bosnia have been raised in Wahabism, and basically this is a somewhat more radical form than that being reported by those from the Islamic Centres.

Bojan Pancevski, who reports for the *Sunday Times2*, wrote a relevant piece on March 31st 2010. He mentioned that fifty Al Qaeda volunteers in Macedonia are being monitored by the government. Pancevski also reports that the Saudis have invested over £415m to build more than 150 mosques and Islamic centres in Bosnia alone.

A private group which I spearheaded in the 1990s (without any government funding) provided humanitarian and medical assistance to families and responded to the orphans and those displaced in Bosnia. In a small Bosnian city called Sanski Most, the size of Kranj, in Slovenia, my colleagues and I noticed that there two mosques in the city. Sanksi Most, a city of nearly 70,000 at its height in 1991 had dwindled to 5,000 refugees during the mid-1990s. The ethnic cleansing was

specifically orchestrated by 'Arkan' - Željko Ražnatović - a paramilitary leader who led a ferocious force, caused widespread havoc in northwest Bosnia.

Just five years after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, there were twelve brand new mosques serving a population of 50,000 in Sanski Most. We should also remember that since the 1990s, it has been reported that 150 mosques (I am deviating from our topic here) and training centres have been built by those following Wahabism in Bulgaria. Krassen Stanchev will correct my statement if I am wrong; however, these reports are being circulated. In America there were three Albanians from Macedonia who were arrested in the U.S. for attempting to bomb a public facility in New Jersey. It should be noted that the Wahabi sect is growing.

Let us look at some of the numbers and unemployment rates in some of these countries that I have pinpointed: Bosnia, where on August 24th 2010 there was a report that 40% of the population was unemployed; and over 50% of the youth were unemployed. Youth unemployment in Kosovo in 2009, according to the EU, was 76%. So when you think about the context of fresh recruits in this region, you have a significant network of individuals to work with - who are desperate for something meaningful in the lives.

During my time in Bosnia in the 1990s criss-crossing the nation, there was an occasion for us to stop at a specific location between Zenica and Sarajevo with a group of American volunteers. There, I met up with the head of the Saudi Relief Agency focusing on Bosnia. I did not share my credentials as an American, but just sat down and we began a conversation. I wanted to learn more about their mission, activities and how they were accomplishing their objectives. His response was chilling when he said: "Bosnia is our Islamic movement beach-head into Europe." He also further stated that: "the West will spend millions, and we will not tire in spending billions." And this was during the late 1990s.

It may surprise some when I say that children in Sarajevo at training centres and schools - even pre-school establishments - are also being trained in Arabic; hence, they are reciting prayers in Arabic. When you think about the culture, the current dynamism and radical Islam's strategies, these are drastic changes from what happened in Bosnia before 1990. One myth in certain circles is that Islam is a religion of peace. Even moderates that I have met with will admit the fact that Islam is not a religion of peace. When you read the Koran in its entirety, you will notice texts that certainly communicate a message contrary to that being promoted in various circles.

I would like to mention a few concerns for us, some that were shared by Bernard Brscic here. The U.S. and Europe truly lack a clear strategy in addressing the rise of radical Islam in the Balkan region.. One issue that Bernard raised is the Dayton Accords, and the importance of reviewing and modifying them, and coming up with something that works better.

As I have observed over the years, the region's weak rule of law, lack of protection of property rights and even the absence of basic elements that contribute to a functioning free market environment have perpetuated these high levels of unemployment. The region does not have a market economy, and its leaders are loath to admit it. The region's leaders have purposely not addressed political corruption - political

corruption and organised crime real issues that must be dealt with through an effort to strengthen the rule of law and create an independent judiciary.

The transfer of large amounts money from Saudi Arabia and its friends to the region are not well-monitored. We realise that young people are sent to other countries from Bosnia to places such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia. It is definitely a potential security threat to Europe as well as to the United States. There are also concerns about Albania and its high levels of corruption, particularly the ties their military personnel have with the extremist groups. Do not forget that Albania entered NATO not too long ago. We also have to begin efforts to co-ordinate more information, because if you go on the web or read periodicals, not much has been written about this. It is something of a taboo subject, saying that we might infringe on the Muslim population. These sensitivities have been communicated, but I believe it is high-time to look at these clear and present dangers.

Also, the civilizational fault line will certainly deepen, and when we think about funding, we cannot just hold the Balkans' responsible. Libya and Iraq, in recent reports from Austria's Hypo Alpe Adria Bank scandals have stated that Libya and Iraq were providing funds to support political candidates in Austria. So when you look at the ties present in the Western hemisphere, and Western democracies, there are significant compromises that ought to be examined. The West must not be complacent; and there is concern that some have in Washington is that there are people emerging who are becoming apologists for the Islamic community and lobbying on behalf of Islamic views within the centre-right movement. We must not acquiesce to political expediency, but verify some of the details when it comes to embracing leaders from the Muslim community that have an agenda to advance Sharia law.

Natasha Srdoc: I have found some of the data on the internet, when researching Bosnia. Apparently in 1468-9, just after the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia, there was the rise of multi-confessional Bosnians, so it was not so much an influx of Turks as we believe today, but the rise of Islamic conversion. In 1468, there were some 185,000 Christians, and 1700 Muslims and some twenty years later, there were 30,000 fewer Christians and some 20,000 more Muslims; thirty years after that, there were 60,000 fewer Christians and about 60,000 more Muslims; and in 1600 Muslims had become the majority. The two reasons given for this dynamic pace of development, was the lack of church organization from the Catholic side, and the second reason was *jizya*, the tax that was paid by all non-Muslims, in the Islamic Empire. Basically it was an opportunity to 'save a soul'; that conversion would be beneficial.

When I was at elementary school, a question repeated throughout the year was: 'what are the ethnic groups living in Bosnia?' The answer was: 'Croats and Serbs'. 'What are the religions in Bosnia?' 'They are Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims'. 'So who are the Muslims?' 'The Muslims are Croatians, or Serbs of Muslim faith.' It may have been brainwashing at that time, but I believe that people lived more or less in a secular setting then. If you ask Steve Hanke, a lecturer in applied economics at John Hopkins University, who advised Ante Markovic (prime minister of Yugoslavia

before the war started)[39] , what was the reason for the war, and how did it begin, he would tell us: it was the critical moment when Milosevic started printing money that was devaluing and giving money to his buddies. At that point nobody else could live in the same country with no monetary supervision, so Slovenia decided to leave as did Croatia in an effort to control their currency. Inflation was 1% a day and perhaps higher than that which contributed to igniting religious conflicts. But that is a discussion for another day. I believe that life was more secular, and perhaps under communism almost suppressed. I certainly did not see many practicing Muslims at that time.

Tomasz Mickiewicz: Natasha, thank you. So we have questions about the diagnosis of what is going on, we have questions about this policy response and those questions are on all levels, starting from the constitutional level, from international law, specific policies, economic policies. So we can follow by discussing any of these.

Silvana Malle: I am just intrigued by one thought when I hear these explanations of the situation in Bosnia, I know this table is not exactly surrounded by fans of the European Union, but the EU has had quite a good way of dealing with East Central Europe in the sense of conditions required for accession to membership. And that seems to raise a question about the western Balkans in general: what, in your assessment, is the great magnetic power of European accession in the current situation that has been described?

Bernard Brscic: Are they not interpreted in the context, for example, in the recent referendum in Turkey, an interesting event and why did the West support the anti-Ataturk reforms which were allowing the de-secularisation of society, because it seems that Turkey was the only functioning Islamic state in the eastern world. But it was functioning only because it was authoritarian, almost a totalitarian society. And now, of course, we want to appear as champions of democracy. But nobody is actually looking at the substantive issues, which are that through democracy, as such, it is only a procedural rule to introduce certain changes that will be anti-liberal and hostile to an open society. In the same sense, I do not think that Europe has any weapons to combat Islamism. Why? Because it treats it as simply a religious issue. But it is not only a religious issue, Islamism is a very dangerous ideology that is ultimately completely hostile to western values. For me, a great disappointment, where the European Union is concerned, was the inability, when the preamble on the European constitution was discussed, that we Europeans were somehow unable to acknowledge Western values. We belong to the Judeo-Christian tradition, and to the tradition of Greco-Roman history. I think this would be a very important step towards defining the European - if you want - paradigm. What are European values? Do we stand for the open society? And what do we do with ideologies like Islamism that is openly hostile to our values?

I think that Europe and the West are committing cultural suicide. The problem is we are unable to articulate the basic value system of Europe because of modern liberalism and relativism. The vital liberal question is, how do you deal with the enemies of the open society? Do you show your liberalism in such a way that you

[39] See Steve Hanke and Kurt Schueler, " Monetary Reform and the Development of a Yugoslav Market Economy" CRCE, London,1991

tolerate, for example, the communists and the Islamists, who are hostile to differences of opinion and who want to impose a totalitarian regime?

Who are we in the west? What is the western tradition? How are we actually willing to articulate our moral and political paradigms?

Islamic Activism in Eurasia: Directions and Demographies

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Introduction[40]

Following the collapse of communism Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union experienced an Islamic revival which occurred within the wider context of a post-Soviet spiritual re-awakening and ideological emancipation. Former Soviet Muslims, who like other ex-Soviet people had been subjected to over seven decades of the Sovietised version of secularism and atheism, were free at last to express their religious affiliation, to conduct essential Islamic practices, including *hajj,* and to re-engage with their co-religionists beyond the ex-Soviet frontiers. All former Soviet Muslim regions witnessed the Islamic construction and publishing boom, the development and upgrading of the existing system of Islamic education, the formation of Islamic and Islamo-national political parties, as well as non-political Islamic educational and cultural organisations. An important financial and methodological factor of the Islamic revival has been the involvement of various foreign Islamic foundations, Islamic teachers and missionaries. Considerable external Islamic educational engagement has confronted ex-Soviet Muslims with Islamic teachings and practices which differed significantly from those learned from their ancestors. Among the most significant implications of ex-Soviet Muslims' re-integration into the wider *ummah* has been the advance of *Salafi* Islam, including that of a radical nature.

The level of post-communist Islamic activism and Islamic radicalization, in particular, have varied considerably from one ex-Soviet Muslim-majority region to the other. Defining factors have been the history of Islamicisation of a particular Muslim people, the extent of their exposure to Russian/Soviet political and cultural domination, the extent of their Sovietised secularisation, the ethno-confessional make-up of their habitat, the severity of official control and suppression and, more generally, the social and economic situation in a particular region.

The Volga-Urals region

In the Volga-Urals, one of Russia's economically advanced and resourceful regions, which is characterised by relatively high living standards, Islamic activism, including of radical nature, has largely been restricted to the sphere of ideas, providing issues for theological and intellectual debate, leaving the bulk of the region's 'ethnic Muslims', mainly Tatars and Bashkirs, unaffected by it. By the end of the 1990s local Muslim clerics admitted the creeping replacement of the traditional Hanafi *madhhab*, which for centuries had ensured Muslims' productive and peaceful existence within the non-Muslim state, by the more rigid Hanbali *madhhab,* which was better suited for homogeneous Muslim states and societies. This dogmatic radicalisation was due to intensive foreign Islamic involvement in the training of the younger generation of Muslim clerics during the 1990s. Most Muslim 'clergy' have rejected the ongoing *madhhab* change and favoured the actual, rather than declared,

[40] The paper is based on the author's recent book: Galina Yemelianova, ed., Radical *Islam in the Former Soviet Union*, Routledge, 2010, ISBN10:0-415-42174-8.

return to traditional *Hanafism,* which also included various ethnic and customary norms. The Muslim 'clerics'' position has been challenged, however, by some local intellectuals who associated traditional *Hanafism* with economic and political backwardness. Like some of their European counterparts, such as Tariq Ramadan and others, they have subscribed to Euro-Islam*,* which represents a comprehensive modification of Islamic beliefs and practices in accordance with the requirements of modern Western societies (Ramadan 2004).

However, the Islamic establishment and Tatar and Bashkir national elites have remained largely disengaged from the grassroots Muslim communities (*mahallas*). They have lacked unity and have been strongly dependent on the state. The Islamic 'clergy' have been weakened by the insufficient funding; the continuing conflict between "old" and "young" imams; the influx in the region of Muslim immigrants (Uzbeks, in particular) who favoured their 'ethnic' imams. Among the implications of the latter has been growing 'Russification' of Tatar/Bashkir Islam through the switch of the language of prayer from Tatar/Bashkir to Russian. Overall, the political and Islamic establishments have had a limited impact on the Islamic dynamic in the region.

Azerbaijan

In oil-rich Azerbaijan the Islamic re-awakening began within the framework of Azerbaijani national revival which was triggered by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the early 1990s. During the 1990s the level and nature of Islamic activism was largely determined by external Islamic influences (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia). Since then the state has pursued a policy of tight legal, political and administrative control over Islam-related activities and has sought to maintain the Shi'a-Sunni balance as a safeguard against excessive Iranian influence.

Overall, the Islamic activism and Islamic radicalization, in particular, have been a marginal phenomenon. As in the Volga-Urals it has been linked to the religious training of young Azerbaijani 'clergy' either in foreign Islamic universities and institutes, or by foreign Islamic teachers at local Islamic colleges. In the 1990s the main providers of Islamic education for Azerbaijanis were Shi'a Islamic universities with funding from Iran, and the Sunni Islamic colleges and foundations of formally secular Turkey. The convergence of these two educational trends has resulted in the parallel development of non-political Shi'a and Sunni Islamic activism among some groups of younger Azerbaijanis. Of notable significance has been the continuing, although limited, 'Sunni-isation' of traditionally Shi'a Azerbaijanis. However, the intellectual position of most Azerbaijani Islamic activists has been congruent with that of the proponents of liberal Islamic reformism in the Volga-Urals and wider Europe.

Three main forms of Islamic activism could identified in present-day Azerbaijan. One is Shi'a traditionalism, represented by the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan under the leadership of Movsun Samadov (Shi'a). It has a limited appeal among young people. The second is Shi'a Modernism which is associated with charismatic young imams, such as Ilqar Ibrahimoğlu from the Içəri *Şəhər Cümə* mosque (Baku), and the like. It has a wider appeal among the young. The third form of Islamic activism is of the *Salafi* nature. Its main representative is the Islamic community of the *Əbu Bəkr* mosque under the leadership of Qamet Suleymanov (the mosque was closed in August 2008). This form of Islamic activism has a growing appeal among young

people both in northern Azerbaijan, and the traditionally Shi'a central Azerbaijan and especially Baku. It is significant that most Islamic activists in Azerbaijan adhere to non-violent methods.

The North Caucasus

In the late 1980s-early 1990s the central features of the Islamic revival in the region were the re-emergence of popular (Sufi) Islam, the fragmentation of the regional Muftiiate along political-administrative lines; the Islamic building and publishing boom; and the proliferation of radical Islam (*Wahhabism*) in Dagestan (Islamic Revival Party, Islamiyya, Islamic *Jamaat* of Dagestan). By the mid-1990s popular Islam, labelled as 'traditional Islam' (Sufism in the north-eastern Caucasus) was legitimized and 'non-traditional' (*Wahhabi, Salafi*) Islam assumed a role of protest ideology in Dagestan. This period witnessed a proliferation of Wahhabism from Dagestan to Chechnya and Ingushetia. The Russo-Chechen conflict acted as catalyst for 'Wahhabisation' of the Chechen resistance. In the late 1990s *Wahhabism* also spread to Kabardino-Balkariia and Karachaevo-Cherkessiia.

Since 1999 the Russian federal and regional authorities have applied tough military and administrative measures to suppress Muslim radicals (*Wahhabis)*. *Wahhabism* was officially banned. This, however, has had only a limited success and has not prevented the further development of an underground Islamist network throughout the region and the merger of radical Islam and terrorism (*Jamaats* Yarmuk and Shariat). Furthermore, in the past five to six years, the North Caucasus has witnessed an upsurge of violence of unprecendented levels. Whereas during the late 1990s and early 2000s, most of the fighting in the region occurred between Russian Federal Troops and Chechen separatist forces, since the mid-2000s, the neighbouring Muslim North Caucasian republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan have bore the brunt of the bloodshed. In the first ten months of 2009 alone, Dagestan witnessed over 180 attacks on high-ranking government officials, military servicemen, local policemen and religious figures, which resulted in over 100 people dead, and 150 wounded. In the meantime, Ingushetia has become the most violent republic of the entire region, with attacks on similar targets occurring almost daily and causing the death of hundreds of individuals. Violence of a similar kind has also engulfed Kabardino-Balkariia and Karchaevo-Cherkessiia, although at a much lower level of intensity. Chechnya, in turn, has seen a return of suicide bombers aiming at police officers, the military and government officials, after the revival of the *Riyad us-Saliheen* battalion by rebel leader Dokku Umarov in the spring of 2009. Despite the declaration of an end to counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya in April of 2009, violence in the republic is far from abating.

Most of these attacks have been conducted by Islam jihadist fighters, belonging to local radical Islamic communities or *jamaats*, who adhere to Salafi (pure) Islam and call for the establishment of an Islamic state in the Caucasus under *Sharia* law.

More recently, these fighting *jamaats* have become further radicalised and their aims and strategies have become closer to the global Islamic *jihadist* movement. Nowadays, there is a growing tendency among most, if not all, Islamic fighters in the North Caucasus to view themselves as part of the broader Islamic global *jihad*. They adhere strictly to key *Salafi* principles currently upheld by other radical Islamic groups worldwide, such as the concepts of *tawhid* (monotheism) and *takfir*

(accusation of non-belief). Compared to the previous generation of Islamic fighters who prioritized national goals, their successors have been increasingly influenced by 'global *jihad*'s agenda. Moreover, there is a rising trend among the various North Caucasian movements to be less ethnically-based and more pan-Caucasian in terms of objectives and organisation – as testified by the declaration of the Caucasian Emirate, by Dokku Umarov in November 2007, and the appointment of non-Chechen fighters to key positions in the resistance movement.

The Ferghana valley

In the early 1990s the major agencies of Islamic activism in the region were the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), *Adolat* (Justice), *Baraka* (Blessing), *Islam Lashkarlari* (The Warriors of Islam) and *Tawba* (Repentance), *Tablighi Jama'at (*emphasis on *da'wa)*; *Nurjular* (Sayid Nursi), *At-Takfir wa-l-Hijra* and some other small groups. In the 1990s the region also witnessed the proliferation of Sufism in the form of Naqshbandiyya (groups of Hazrat Ibrahim and Husaniyya), Rifaiyya and Qadiriyya *tariqats* (brotherhoods).

In 1996-99 a militant Uzbek-centred Islamist organization, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) under Tahir Yuldashev ('Faruq') and Juma Hojiev (Namangani) was the leading radical Islamic force in the region. The IMU prioritized political and military engagement rather than religious education and indoctrination. The IDU members portrayed themselves as *mujahedin* (Islamic warriors) waging a *jihad* against the rule of *kafir* President Karimov and the creation of an Islamic state in the Ferghana valley. Many of them underwent a combat training in *jihadist* camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya. The IMU militants used predominantly guerilla tactics against the Uzbek state and police employees and other official targets. They strongly relied on foreign support, especially from the Pakistani-based *Jamiat Ulema-e- Islam* (Assembly of Islamic Clergy) and later the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. The IDU's finances derived from its involvement in drugs trafficking from Afghanistan to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, hostage-taking, robberies and other forms of criminal activities.

Since 1999 *Hizb al-Tahrir Al-Islamii* (Party of Islamic Liberation) has been the major Islamist organisation in the region. (Smaller Islamist groups included *Al-Akramiyya* (1996); *Hizb an-Nusra* (Party of Victory (1999) and Islamic Jihad *Union* (2003) and Islamic Party of Turkestan).

It is possible to identify three main factors of Islamic radicalisation in the region.

1. <u>Economic and social hardships</u>

   - Drastic decline in living standards as a result of the reduction in arable land
   - The disruption of previously unified water system and the lack of state loans for agriculture

- High unemployment: *de facto* over 30 per cent of the Ferghana Valley's economically active population, especially young people under 25 and women
- High level of seasonal migration among men (to Kazakhstan and Russia)
- Proliferation of drug-trafficking, prostitution and other illegal activities
- Severe restriction of movement within the Valley due to numerous border controls and customs. This has jeopardized the support networks which had played a central role in the well-being of many families
- Widespread resentment of actions of border guards and customs officers who supplement their meagre income by arbitrary customs fines on local traders
- Inaccessibility of higher education for the vast majority of impoverished families (compared to the Soviet period)
- Absence of governmental policies for the young and relevant funding analogous to the pioneer and *komsomol* organizations
- Creeping re-traditionalization of local rural societies and the social marginalization of its young people. The reverse of relative gender equality in favour of the relations based on male supremacy and domination. The rise in girls' early withdrawal from formal schooling, their early marriages and their subsequent confinement to the Islamicized household routine.

2. Political

- Lack of democracy and people's disillusion with the possibility of change through legal political process
- Resentment against pervasive corruption and inefficiency of state institutions
- Mass frustration with the reluctance of regional governments to address acute ecological and socio-economic problems of the Valley
- Repression by law-enforcement officers against Islamists and their sympathizers and heavy-handedness of border guards
- Official "anti-Islamic" foreign policies of governments of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and initially of Uzbekistan.

3. Theological

- Continuing predominance of poorly-educated 'traditional' Islamic clergy (over 90 per cent in the Ferghana valley)
- Theological incompetence

- Corruption and pro-government position
- Avoidance of a debate with Islamists on vital
- Socio-economic political and ideological issues
- As a result, a low level of public trust in them and growing attractiveness of *Tahriris* and other unofficial Islamic preachers and activists who offer ideological guidance and practical assistance
- *Islamists'* better religious education than most of traditional official Muslim clerics;
- *Islamists'* belonging to local clan and regional network and their ability to adjust their tactics and salvation message to particular local conditions
- *Islamists*' substantial material and financial resources which enable them to design and produce locally and in local languages their propaganda video and audio materials, leaflets and other Islamic publications, as well as to provide welfare assistance to the most needy members of local communities.

Conclusion

In the Ferghana valley in Central Asia and North Caucasus, Islamism has transcended theological and intellectual discourse and fused with politics. Its patterns have resembled some Middle Eastern Islamist movements of the past. Thus, like Middle Eastern Islamists of the late 1960s, local Islamists rejected kafir (impious) oppressive political systems, which were 'camouflaged' by a democratic façade, as well as the pseudo market economy, that in the difficult conditions of post-Soviet transition, became synonymous with economic break-down. Echoing Sayyid al-Qutb and Mawdudi they regarded the sovereignty of God as the main criterion of an Islamic state (Kepel 2003: 372, 274). They believed that the creation of the North Caucasian, or Central Asian Caliphates would radically improve the well-being of the vast majority of its inhabitants through the dissolution of the existing political-administrative borders within the region and the replacement of corrupt and inefficient governments by fair and competent Islamic administration under Caliphate rule. The official suppression and imprisonment of local Islamists and their sympathisers boosted their martyr image as the only defenders of impoverished and desperate people, and contributed to their appeal amongst some disadvantaged and disillusioned young men.

At the same time the actual content of the Islamists' salvation message, as well as the forms of their activism, differed between the North Caucasus and the Ferghana valley. From the late 1990s Islamists of the north-eastern Caucasus, and from the early 2000s of the north-western Caucasus, have widely embraced jihadist ideology and merged with various pro-violence and terrorist organisations and groupings. An important contributing factor has been the diffusion of Chechen *jihadists* in the region as a result of the strengthening of the authoritarian rule of President Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechniia. Islamists have been either directly responsible for, or involved in sporadic

attacks on, local militiamen and other representatives of various law enforcement agencies in Dagestan, Ingushetiia, Kabardino-Balkariia and other parts of the North Caucasus.

By comparison, members of the dominant Islamist movement, represented by the *Hizb al-Tahrir,* have maintained their strict adherence to peaceful methods of *da'awa* and to welfare provision to those in need. In this respect their activities have had much in common with contemporary Middle Eastern Islamist organisations, such as *Hamas* in Palestine.

It could be argued that there are major similarities between the dynamic and patterns of current Islamic radicalisation in Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union and the historical experiences of radicalism in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. There are important parallels, for example, between what has been happening in the last decade in Muslim Eurasia and the spread of Islamic radicalism in the wake of the failed secular nationalist projects in Egypt and Algeria in the late 1960s and '70s.

Appendix 1

Major characteristics of post-Soviet Muslims

Population: over 60 million
Lingua franca - Russian
Doctrinal affiliation: the majority of the ex-Soviet Muslims are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi juridical school, although Chechens, Ingush and the majority of Dagestanis adhere to the Shafi'a juridical school of Sunni Islam; the majority of Azeris are Shia (Twelvers); there is also a relatively small group of Ismailis (Nizarites) in the Pamir mountains of Tajikistan;
Ethnic composition:
Turkic peoples (Uzbeks, Kygryz, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Azeris, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kumyks, Nagais, Balkars, Karachay, Meskhetian Turks;
Caucasian peoples: Chechens, Avars, Ingush, Dargins, Laks, Lezgins, Kabartay, Abkhaz, Adygheans, Abazins;
Indo-European peoples: Tajiks, Russians.
"More religious" peoples: Avars, Kymyks and some other peoples of Dagestan, Chechens, Ingush, Tajiks and Uzbeks;
"Less religious" peoples: Lezgins, Azeris, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Turkmen.

Appendix 2

The North Caucasus

Social and doctrinal characteristics of 'Islamic traditionalists'

- Syncretic belief system (Islam, pre-Islamic beliefs, *adat*, Caucasian etiquette);

- Deep integration into the system of traditional community, ethnic, clan and family ties;
- Closed, localised nature and hostility towards *other* Muslims;
- Compliance with secular authorities;
- Interpretation of *jihad* as spiritual self-perfection of Muslims;
- Sufis as leading representatives of Islamic traditionalists:
    - Veneration of saints and sheikhs;
    - Practices of ziiarat, reading of the *Qur'an* at cemeteries, amulets and talismans;
    - Domination of pro-government Muftiiates.

Social and doctrinal characteristics of Islamic radicals

- *Tawhid* (strict monotheism)
- Rejection of Sufism
- Emphasis on *bid'a* (sinful innovation*)*
- Emphasis on *takfir* (accusation of non-belief) ; the doctrine of *at-takfir wa al-*
- *hijra*
- Rejection of *madhhabs* (juridical schools within Sunni Islam)
- Emphasis on the armed *jihad*
- Ultimate goal - an Islamic state.

Appendix 3

Organisation and ideology of *Hizb Al-Tahrir al-Islamii*

- Estimated number of *Tahriris* and their sympathizers between eight and twenty per cent of the population of the Ferghana valley);
- Pyramidal structure: primary cell of 5 members;

- Strict discipline;
- A monthly membership due (5-20 per cent of individual monthly income);
- *HT* ideology- *Salafism* (Islamic fundamentalism*),* but tolerance towards local "folk" Islam;
- Skilful attuning of the HT message to local needs and conditions;
- Goal – the creation of Central Asian Caliphate, based on the *shari'a;*
- Elimination of borders between Central Asian states;
- A fair government, justice for everyone, and an end to corruption and social inequality;
- Rejection of armed *jihad* and readiness for dialogue with authorities and Islamic officialdom.

Ethno-national and social profile of *Tahriris* :

- Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uighurs, Kyrgyz and others)
- Aaverage age; 25 years old
- Female membership
- Lower middle class

Islam in Contemporary Russia

Alexey Zhuravskiy

Euro-Islam is a new phenomenon for Europe. Historically, European contact with Muslims was mainly of an external nature. The term "Euro-Islam" appeared only in the first half of the 1990s. In 1991 it was not even mentioned in such a profound study of Islam as Gilles Kepel's *Les Banlieues de l'Islam*.

As for Russian Islam, we can consider it as an old and traditional phenomenon for Russia. In fact, the Eastern Slavonic tribes had met with Muslims long before the former had any forms of state system and before they adopted Orthodox Christianity in 988. And since the second half of the XVI century (the conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberian khanates) when Muslims of those areas became subjects of the Russian Tsar, Islam has become an integral part of the Russian state system and culture. That is why Islam in Russia has never been perceived as something alien, it was rather perceived as our own alien entity being deprived of any principal cultural difference and significance. Orthodox mentality could be very hostile to "pagan busurmans", but that hostility was completely superficial, based on everyday life differences. The situation looked very similar to the one that we can observe in contemporary Europe.

Demographic Situation

There are no exact figures of the Muslim population living on Russian Federation territory. The spread in estimates is very significant. According to the State Statistical Office of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR) during the 1989 census, 12 million Muslims lived in Russia. According to the most cautious estimates, in 1997 the number of Russian Muslims amounted to more than 15 million people (significant difference in estimates was mainly caused by the inaccuracy in defining the share of believers in the RF population. The figures vary from 20% to 80%) According to the unofficial data in 2010 the number was 17 million (12.5%). It should be taken into consideration that the demographic situation for the Muslim population is much better than for other groups.

Indirectly the number of Muslim believers is witnessed by the increase in the number of mosques. By October 1917 30,000 mosques were active in the Russian Empire. From the middle of the 1920s, the suppression of Islamic religious life and culture began. About 12,000 mosques were either closed or demolished. During Stalin's Terror practically all the Islamic elite was extinguished – from 30 to 50,000 people. In 1948 there were only 416 officially registered mosques in the RSFSR and in 1968 – a mere 311. At the beginning of 1991 Russia registered 870 mosques; in 1995 – 5,000 and in 2000 – over 7,000. According to the RF Ministry of Justice data, in January 2000 in Russia there were 51 religious Islamic centres, 2,933 parishes and communes and 114 educational institutions. More than 800 students were studying at Islamic universities and colleges in the Arab countries.

Nowadays Islam is widespread in the Northern Caucasus, Tatarstan (54%), Bashkortostan (54%), Orenburgskaya oblast (10%), Udmurtiya (7%), Mariy El

Republic (6%), Chuvashiya (3%), Nizhegorodskaya oblast (1.5%). Recently the share of the Muslim population has been considerably growing in Astrakhan oblast due to migration from the Northern Caucasus (according to certain data, in 2008 there were 500,000 Muslims out of a total population of 1.1 million.)

Moscow is the largest Muslim city not only in Russia but also in the whole of Europe according to various data from 1.5 to2 million – 15%-17%. In the media the expression "Moscow is the second Mecca" can be found more and more often.

Muslim Areas

Apart from Moscow there are two major Muslim areas in Russia – the Northern Caucasus and Povolzhye (with Tatarstan as its centre). Each area is self-sufficient as far as cultural and religious traditions are concerned. Despite certain sporadic attempts to demonstrate their intentions to integrate they live in separate worlds.

"Russian" Islam cannot be called monolithic either. It is considered that nowadays there are three main trends in Russian Islam: traditionalist (official), radical and liberal.

The Traditionalist trend is indisputably dominant in the Islam of Povolzhye. Radical trends show themselves much more vigorously in Northern Caucasian Islam, although not in the majority of the population.

Contrary to what most people think, the most Islamized republic of the Northern Caucasus is Dagestan, not Chechnya. The population of Dagestan has increased by 400,000 people during the last eight years and amounts to three million people now; 95 % are Muslims and there are 803 officially registered Muslim associations compared to 500 in Tatarstan.) The role of Islam in politics has always been and still is very important in Dagestan. It is in this republic where the ideas of Islamic alternative and North Caucasian Islamic fundamentalism (both in its moderate and Wahhabi form) have taken their modern shape.

Most Cautious Short-Term Forecasts

By 2020 the number of Muslims will have increased. Given the current population growth rates, especially in the Northern Caucasus, and taking into consideration the migration, it could amount to 25 million people. Taking into account the fact that the overall number of Russian citizens will decrease to 130 million (from the current 143 million), "the Muslim share" will reach 17-19%. Simultaneously, the restructuring of shares will take place within the Muslim population - the largest group will be represented by Caucasians. The number of immigrants of North Caucasian origin in big Russian cities will also increase both in absolute and relative terms.

Two opposite trends will be more distinct than they are nowadays: on the one hand – dispersion of Muslims, first of all of Caucasians, in Russian society; on the other hand – their intention to keep their identity, the ethnic character of their business, especially at the first stages. Hence, it is possible that a new generation of politicians will emerge, who will represent the interests of various groups on the basis of ethnic and confessional characteristics. Quasi-religious movements could also emerge. (A similar process took place in the 1990s, but a trustworthy all-Russia party with

Muslim social motivation was never formed.) These movements will not be characterized by separatist intentions.

Russia, as well as the rest of the world, will not manage "to get rid of" radical Islam, which will continue to exist under various names – Wahhabism, Islamism, fundamentalism. As before, it will be most vividly represented in the Northern Caucasus. However, seats of religious radicalism will be also preserved in Muslim Povolzhye. This is connected with the preaching activity of a new generation of clergy, educated in the Arab countries.

Alas, but even in ten years time terrorism under religious slogans will remain the disaster for Russia and not only for it. However, even despite such circumstances the authorities (including most probably the central ones) will have to start a systematic dialogue with the moderate Islamists.

In ethnic and confessional relations certain tensions will be preserved, which will be accompanied by direct clashes. This is the situation that we already observe. And if administration at all levels, leaders of ethnic communes, trustworthy clergymen play a waiting game, such conflicts will be more frequent and severe ("mini-wars" may even occur).

Thus, Russia will not become a Muslim country as some of our contemporaries – political scientists and writers - try to suggest. But "the Islamic factor" in the life of its society, in the formation of various political groups' orientation will be more noticeable.

In this connection, the further growth of Islamophobia will take place, which will be firmly established in the political and everyday life mentality and behaviour in many Russian citizens.

The main obstacle in the way of Islamisation of Russia was identified by Kniaz' Vladimir as long ago as 986: "Russia's merriment is drinking, we cannot exist without it."